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VOLUME 1973 SUMMER, 1973 NUMBER 3
THE FORGOTTEN MAN ON THE WELFARE
ROLL: A STUDY OF PUBLIC SUBSIDIES
FOR STRIKERS
JAMES T. CARNEY*
In determining the substance of bargainable terms in the collective
agreement, however, the parties are left free-in principle at least-to
reinforce their demands with economic force. If negotiations fail,
differences are resolved by economic contest, and collective bargaining
is conducted with an awareness by both parties that either can resort
to economic weapons to resolve a dispute. But even here the law does
not play a wholly passive role, for it prescribes the sword and shield,
the net and trident with which the gladiators do battle.'
Among the most important weapons given by the law to employees
is the provision of subsidies from the public coffer for the duration
of labor disputes which result in cessation of employment. By increas-
ing the economic power of employees during strikes, the government
exerts a significant influence on modem labor-management relations;
yet the practical and legal consequences of subsidies to strikers have
been little studied or discussed.2 The three major sources of public
* Adjunct Professor of Law, Duquesne University. B.A., 1964, LL.B., 1967,
Yale University.
1. C. SUMMERS & H. WELLiNGTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 753
(1968).
2. Irving Bernstein, chronicler of the American labor movement, described the
provision of public subsidies to strikers as "a circumstance with little inherent signifi-
cance." I. BERNSTEIN, TURBULENT YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER
1933-1941, at 307 (1969) [hereinafter cited as BERNsTEIN]. The definitive empirical
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aid to strikers are welfare benefits, unemployment compensation, and
food stamps.'
I. WELFARE BENEFITS
The pre-Depression welfare system in the United States was mod-
eled after the English Poor Law of 1601.' Under the Poor Law each
parish was responsible for preventing its poor from starving. This
goal was to be achieved by the principle of "less eligibility," which
set the level of relief lower than the amount which an individual
could earn by working. Generally, participation in a workhouse by an
able-bodied adult or child was a condition precedent to his receiving
relief. In the United States the town or the county took the place
of the English parish, but little else changed. The state provided for
study of the relationship between public subsidies for strikers and labor-management
relations is A. THIEBLoT & R. CowiN, WELFARE AND STRIES: THE USE OF PUDLIC
FUNDs TO SUPPORT STRIKERs (1972) [hereinafter cited as THIEBLOT & COWIN], to
which I made some contribution in terms of background information on the early
history of welfare benefits for strikers. The first article on the legal aspects of sub-
sidies for strikers was 16 DEPAUL L. REv. 516 (1967). The major article on the
legal questions involved in welfare benefits for strikers is Comment, Welfare for
Strikers: ITT v. Minter, 39 U. Cm. L. REv. 79 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Welfare for
Strikers]. See also Pati & Hill, Economic Strikers, Public Aid and Industrial Relations,
23 LAB. L.J. 32 (1972); Note, Welfare Assistance to Strikers in Need: The Protestant
Ethic Revisited, 67 Nw. U.L. Rnv. 245 (1972). This article will consider the legal
problems and economic consequences not only of welfare provisions, but also of the two
other major subsidy programs, unemployment compensation and food stamps.
3. It should be recognized that strikers on a given occasion may receive sig-
nificant subsidies from several other federal programs by virtue of their eligibility
for welfare benefits or food stamps. These programs include: Medical Assistance
(Medicaid), 42 U.S.C. §§ 801-05 (Supp. II, 1972), see SOCIAL & REI ADILiTATwE
SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, CHARACTErISTICS OF STATE
ASSIsTANcE PROGRAMS UNDER TITLE = OF THE SocIAL SECURITY ACT (Pub. As-
sistance Series No. 49, 1970); School Lunch Programs, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1751-64 (1970,
Supp. 11, 1972); food commodities (prior to the food stamp program); and mortgage
relief or rent supplements, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (1970, Supp. Il, 1972). See
THIEBLOT & CowiN 12-14, 19, 50, 196. On the whole, however, the support given to
strikers by these programs is not substantial. Id. at 195-96. In addition, strikers
may continue to receive certain other subsidies, such as veterans' benefits, which they
were receiving prior to the strike and which are not related to any need created by
the strike. See Welfare for Strikers 85. Because it exists independent of the strike,
this aid does not have the significant impact on collective bargaining that provision
of special subsidies does. Indeed, these payments are not subsidies to strikers as
such and are, accordingly, beyond the scope of this article.
4. Poor Relief Act of 1601, 43 Eliz. 1, c. 2. For a discussion of the problems of
public subsidization of striking employees in England, see Jennings, Poor Relief in
Industrial Disputes, 46 L.Q. REV. 225 (1930).
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indigents who had no definite place of abode, war veterans, victims
of natural disaster, and certain special classes of needy persons such
as dependent children, the blind, and the aged. The federal govern-
ment had no role in public assistance except to provide veterans' pen-
sions and disaster relief. On the other hand, private agencies often
played an important, and sometimes dominant, role in some munici-
palities.5
The pre-Depression welfare system was designed to help those in-
dividuals who, because of physical or mental defects, were incapable
of securing gainful employment; it was not designed for, nor was it
capable of, providing assistance to any great number of able-bodied
unemployed. Not surprisingly, then, the system collapsed with the rise
of mass unemployment during the Depression. By 1931, all private
and local relief agencies were without resources; by 1933, even the
states could no longer sustain the burden of providing for all people
without income or resources. 6 One of the first tasks of the Roose-
velt Administration, in fact, was to save the country from starvation.
The Federal Emergency Relief Act in 1933 established the Federal
Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), which was given some
$500 million to distribute as grants-in-aid to the bankrupt local and
state public assistance agencies. Under Harry Hopkins, its administra-
tor, FERA took decisive action to assist the unemployed.8
Two months after taking office, however, Hopkins encountered a
problem the dimensions and implications of which neither he nor any-
one else recognized at the time. In May 1933 the Executive Direc-
tor of the Pennsylvania State Emergency Relief Board wrote Hopkins
questioning the eligibility for relief under the Act of certain strikers
in Montgomery County. Hopkins answered that the Federal Emer-
gency Relief Act was intended to provide relief for "needy unem-
ployed" without regard to labor disputes in which they might be in-
volved, unless the Department of Labor determined that "the basis for
relief is unreasonable and unjustified."9  Although Hopkins' position
5. See J. BROWN, PUBLIC RELIF: 1929-1939, at 3-59 (1940) [hereinafter cited
as BROWN].
6. Id. at 63-142.
7. Act of May 12, 1933, ch. 30, 48 Stat. 55.
8. See BRowN 301; A. SCHLESINGER, Tim COMING OF Tim NEW DEAL 263-67
(1959).
9. Hopkins' full reply was:
The Federal Emergency Relief Administration is concerned with administer-
Vol. 1973:469]
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was not supported by the language or legislative history of the Act,' 0
the idea that relief should be given to all those in need has some plausi-
bility. Any inconsistency between Hopkins' principle of supplying
relief and the exception for "unreasonable and unjustified" strikes was
more theoretical than real, since the Department of Labor developed
no means for deciding whether a strike was "unreasonable or unjusti-
fied." The significance of Hopkins' position cannot be overstated; it
was the first recorded instance in which the government" authorized
the expenditure of public funds for individuals whose need arose
not from circumstances beyond their control, but from the deliberate
decision to strike in an effort to better their economic condition.12
Among the first to benefit from Hopkins' policy was the Cannery
and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union which, in the fall of 1933,
struck the growers in the southern end of the Central Valley of Call-
ing relief to the needy unemployed and their families. Each case applying for
relief to the local emergency relief agencies should be treated on its merits
as a relief case wholly apart from a controversy in which the wage earner
may be involved.
The FERA will not attempt to judge the merits of any labor dispute.
State and Federal agencies, as well as courts, exist which are duly qualified
to act as arbiters and adjusters in such disputes.
Unless it be determined by the Department of Labor that the basis for re-
lief is unreasonable and unjustified, the FERA authorizes local relief agencies
to furnish relief to the families of striking wage earners after careful in-
vestigation has shown that their resources are not sufficient to meet emer-
gency needs.
FERA, Moirrm.y REPORT 7 (July 1933).
10. Federal Emergency Relief Act § 4(a), ch. 30, § 4(a), 48 Stat. 57 (1933):
Out of the funds of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation made available
by this Act, the Administrator is authorized to make grants to the several
States to aid in meeting the costs of furnishing relief and work relief and in
relieving the hardship and suffering caused by unemployment in the form of
money, service, materials, and/or commodities to provide the necessities of
life to persons in need as a result of the present emergency, and/or to their
dependents, whether resident, transient, or homeless.
11. It should be noted that private relief had, on occasion, been given to strikers.
The Red Cross, for example, assisted strikers in Harlan County, Kentucky, during the
coal strike of 1931. BERNTsrhN 381. In City of Spring Valley v. County Bureau,
115 II1. App. 545 (1904), the court struck down a local administrative regulation dis-
qualifying strikers from receipt of public assistance under a state law which provided
room, board, and necessary care for non-resident diseased persons. The court's ra-
tionale, however, was that the County Bureau lacked authority to adopt the regula-
tion, since the law specifically provided that diseased individuals without someone to
care for them would be assisted by the state. The "need" of these individuals arose
not from their participation in a strike but from their affliction with smallpox.
12. FERA affirmed this position in October 1933 and again in September 1934.
See U.S. WoRKs PRoGREss ADMI sTRATIoN, CHRONOLOGY OF THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY
RELEF AomImSATON 22,25 (1937), cited in TImmLOT & Cowni 34.
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fornia. The strike was subsidized with federal funds by the California
State Relief Administration, which decided the strikers were eligible
for relief and supplied their wants. The workers learned, however,
that the provision of subsidies for strikers is a two-edged sword, for
FERA used the threat of withdrawal of relief to obtain acceptance
of a compromise settlement.' 3
The first widely publicized provision of relief to strikers occurred
a year later in connection with the 1934 textile strike.14  On August
27, 1934, newspapers across the country reported that the striking
members of the United Textile Workers would receive public relief.15
This announcement raised a storm of protest;16 a few days later, the
Alabama Relief Administrator terminated relief to strikers, ending the
strike.' I
Hopkins' justification for the new federal policy of supporting strik-
ers was that subsidies would not have a significant impact on the num-
ber or duration of strikes and would tend to prevent violence. The
dispositions of the California agricultural strike of 1933 and the textile
strike of 1934 indicate that subsidies did, in fact, influence both the
duration of strikes and the ability of the government to control the
terms of strike settlements.' Nonetheless, Hopkins' view generally
prevailed, and the eligibility of strikers for FERA assistance was estab-
lished.' 9
With the passage of the Social Security Act2" in 1935, Congress
reorganized the public assistance program by establishing a system of
13. BERNSTEIN 156-60.
14. Id. at 307-08.
15. Id. at 308.
16. Spokesmen for the Southern States Industrial Council and the Illinois Manu-
facturers Association complained to Hopkins. An attorney for textile manufacturers
in Georgia wrote to President Roosevelt: "Mhe strike never would have been called
. . without the financial support from the Federal Government." Letter from H.H.
Swift to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Aug. 27, 1934, quoted in BERNSTEIN 308.
17. BERNSTEIN 312.
18. Hopkins also mistakenly suggested that the costs to the government of supply-
ing welfare benefits to strikers would be "almost negligible." Id. at 307. See note
50 infra.
19. BROwN 270:
In many localities from time to time, there were departures from the general
principle and in some cases, local officials yielding to pressures from labor or
from industry gave or refused relief on some other basis than need. On the
whole, however, the Federal policy was followed in local practice ....
20. Act of Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 301
et seq. (1970).
Vol. 1973:469]
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grants-in-aid for the states, which in turn provided assistance to de-
pendent children, the aged, the blind, and other special groups. Con-
gress did not consider the question of public subsidization of strikers;
the Roosevelt Administration planned to employ most of the able-bod-
ied unemployed on public works and to restrict the new welfare system
to unemployables .2  After the 1935 Act, the states dispensed two
types of welfare benefits. First, they took over the responsibility
for financing (in part) and administering (in total) payments to the
special groups under the Social Security Act. Secondly, they continued
their own programs of general assistance, financed solely out of state
funds, for other needy individuals not included in the federal categories.
There is no indication that any state legislature, in enacting a gen-
eral assistance program, considered whether such a program should
be used to aid strikers. Certainly, the state statutes contain no dis-
qualification for strikers, although some contain ambiguous work re-
quirements which disqualify applicants for failure to accept work with-
out good cause,2 2 and which could be interpreted by welfare officials
as justifying or mandating striker disqualification. 2  Hopkins' decision
in the Montgomery County case, however, strongly influenced the new
state welfare administrators, many of whom had participated in FERA,
to pay benefits to needy strikers.24 Although the exact dates on which
many states began to provide aid to strikers are unknown, a few did,
through their interpretation of state standards for administering both
the state and federal programs, so provide prior to World War II. In
Pennsylvania, union members were even told in advance of a strike
that the state would supply relief.25
Public subsidization of strikers became more widespread after World
War II. Labor union participation in various war relief projects
established ties with both public and private relief organizations. In
21. See BROWN 306-12. The Federal Emergency Relief Act was intended only to
be a temporary means of dealing with the problem of massive need. Id.
22. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 11308-08.8 (Deering Supp. 1972);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 518 (Supp. 1970); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 11-20(3)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 117, § 3 (Supp. 1973); N.Y.
Soc. SERV. LAW § 131(4) (McKinney Supp. 1972); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 5113.04
(Page 1970, Supp. 1972).
23. See Welfare for Strikers 96-97.
24. See BROwN 270.
25. On July 5, 1936, Thomas Kennedy, Lieutenant Governor of Pennsylvania and
an officer of the United Mine Workers, told the Steel Workers Organizing Committee
that it could depend on relief funds in the event of a strike. BERNsTiN 434.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss3/1
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1946 the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) formed the
Community Services Program to utilize these ties in order to assure
that a fund would be permanently available to support union members
during strikes. This organized approach to exploiting public welfare
and assistance funds for the benefit of the labor union movement was
used successfully in the strikes against General Motors in Michigan
in 1945,8 in the United Steel Workers strike in 1946, and in the Elec-
trical Workers strike against General Electric in Pennsylvania in
1948 .17 The greatest single accomplishment of organized labor's ef-
forts to systematically obtain welfare benefits was the receipt of an
estimated $45 million in public assistance during the four-month
steel strike in 1959-1960.28 In addition, unions made organized ef-
forts to gain representation in community welfare organizations and
to lobby for aid. General public assistance has apparently been avail-
able for strikers in California since World War Hl, 29 in Illinois since
1950,30 and in New York since 1952.31
26. THIEBLOT & COWIN 37-38. The Attorney General of Michigan in 1948 issued
an opinion holding strikers eligible for general assistance. [1947-1948] MicH. ATr'Y
GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 729:
It is the opinion of the Attorney General that as to whether the strike is
"lawful" or "unlawful" has no bearing on the question. If the individual is
participating in either an "unlawful" strike or a "lawful" strike and is eligible
for aid under the welfare act, as determined by the welfare board, such per-
son is entitled to relief.
27. THIEBLOT & COWN 37-38. In 1956 the AFL-CIO founded its Department
of Community Services which assumed the functions of the old Community Services
Program. Id. at 40.
28. This estimate was made by I.W. Abel, then Secretary-Treasurer of the United
Steel Workers; the union contribution was only about $20 million. U.S. NEWS & WoRLD
REP., Oct. 3, 1960, at 101-03. Another estimate credited various federal, state,
and local benefits to the striking steelworkers at $22,750,000. N. CHAMBERLAIN & J.
KUHN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 174 (2d ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as CHAMBERLAIN
& KUHN].
At present, the following twenty-four states provide general assistance to strikers:
Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin. Letter from Lawrence M. Cohen, Lederer, Fox & Grove,
Chicago, to author, June 7, 1972 (reflecting an informal survey of state officials).
It should be recognized that eligibility requirements, as well as the type and quantity
of assistance available, vary from state to state, and even between localities within a
given state. See Welfare for Strikers 97.
29. See THIEBLOT & COWIN 135.
30. See Strat-O-Seal Mfg. Co. v. Scott, 72 11. App. 2d 480, 218 N.E.2d 227
(1966); Illinois Attorney General, Opinion (May 27, 1950) (unpublished).
31. See Lascaris v. Wyman, 61 Misc. 2d 212, 215, 305 N.Y.S.2d 212, 216 (Sup.
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Despite the availability of general assistance benefits in many states,
the use of public assistance as a source of subsidy for strikers did not
become significant until after the 1961 amendment 2 to the Social Se-
curity Act. Prior to 1961 the federal government had assisted the
states in providing Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) .33 Eligibility for this aid was limited to families whose need
was created by the death, absence, or incapacity of a parent. Propo-
nents of welfare reform claimed that this eligibility requirement forced
many fathers into real or pretended "abandonment" of their families.
This problem allegedly became widespread with increased unemploy-
ment during the 1959-1960 recession.84 The 1961 amendment, by
providing for federal funding of the new Aid to Families with Depend-
ent Children of Unemployed Parents (AFDC-U), was intended to
remedy this situation by expanding assistance to include needy children
of unemployed parents.35 There is little evidence to indicate that Con-
gress intended through the creation of AFDC-U to provide a new
source of public subsidies for strikers; indeed, Congress does not seem
to have considered the possibility. But by changing the operative
language of the Act to permit aid to children whose parents were pres-
ent but unemployed, Congress permitted states, in effect, to provide
AFDC-U benefits to strikers' families. Admittedly, prior to 1961 chil-
dren "deserted" by strikers could obtain AFDC benefits, assuming the
family met the financial eligibility requirements. But there is no evi-
dence that many strikers took advantage of this possibility, probably
Ct. 1969). Indeed, some members of Congress noted receipt of general assistance by
strikers as early as 1947. See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (1947).
32. Act of May 8, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-31, § 407, 75 Stat. 75, amending 42
U.S.C. H9 601-06 (1958) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1970, Supp. II, 1972)).
33. Act of Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, § 401-06, 49 Stat. 627, as amended, 42
U.S.C. H§ 601-06 (1970).
34. See S. REP. No. 165, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); Hearings on H.R. 3854 &
3865 Before the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 94-95
(1961); 107 CONG. REc. 1679 (1961) (remarks of President Kennedy); Welfare for
Strikers 88-89.
35. S. REP. No. 165, supra note 34, at 1-3. See also Hearings on H.R. 12080
Before Senate Comm. on Finance, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 264 (1967); 107 CONG. REC.
1679 (1961) (remarks of President Kennedy). The states provide about one-third of
the funds for the AFDC-U program. 42 U.S.C. § 603 (1970).
36. But see 107 CONG. REc. 3766 (1961) (remarks of Cong. Mills) (states may
use AFDC-U to subsidize strikers). If a father is receiving unemployment compensa-
tion-regardless, presumably, of whether he is "unemployed" as a result of participa-
tion in a strike-AFDC-U benefits are prohibited by statute. 42 U.S.C. § 607(b)
(2) (C) (ii) (1970).
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because they were unwilling to leave their homes .3 The AFDC-U
program offered the striker the possibility of obtaining welfare for his
family without "abandoning" it. Not surprisingly, strikers were not
slow to take advantage of the program."'
Of course, the striker's family does have to meet the financial
eligibility requirements of the AFDC-U program. In 1961 Congress
delegated to the states the task of establishing financial eligibility stand-
ards. 9 These standards differ substantially from state to state.4" Nev-
ertheless, the families of strikers can meet the income requirements
of almost every state since their sole source of income dries up with
the occurrence of the strike.4' The asset standards are a different
story. When enforced they disqualify great numbers of strikers' fami-
lies.4 -  There is, however, considerable evidence to suggest that errors
in administration and outright fraud enable many strikers to avoid the
asset requirements.
37. One major exception occurred in the 1959-1960 steel strike, since AFDC must
have been a significant source of the public subsidies received by striking steelworkers
and their families. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
38. See THIEBLOT & CowIN 11. For an example of an attempt to restrict AFDC
benefits to "employable persons," see H.R. 6004, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
39. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 601, 602(a)(7), 603 (1970, Supp. I1, 1972); S. REtP. No.
165, supra note 34, at 3; 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(2) (1972) (regulations of the Dep't
of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) ).
40. Generally, state legislatures delegate rule-making authority, including responsi-
bility for prescribing financial eligibility criteria, to the appropriate state agency. E.g.,
MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 16.410 (1968), 16.414 (Supp. 1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26,
§ 16 (1969); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-105(e) (1973). In some states, legislatures have
provided a general criterion which the administrative regulation must meet. E.g.,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 503(d) (Supp. 1970) ("reasonable subsistence compatible
with decency and health"); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 4-1.6 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973)
("insufficient to meet the basic maintenance needs of the family or the child"); WIs.
STAT. ANN. § 49.01 (1957, Supp. 1973) ("dependent person"). The administrative
regulations vary considerably, but most provide that unless a family's income, less
designated exclusions, reaches a specified limit, aid will be provided. See THIEBLOT
& COWIN 246-49.
41. The fact that strikers' families frequently qualify automatically suggests that
the eligibility standards themselves are defective. Whether the standard is indefinite
or specifies a certain income level, see note 40 supra, a striker's family which depends
entirely on the striker's income would qualify, without further inquiry. See generally
Note, AFDC Income Attribution: The Man-in-the-House and Welfare Grant Reduc-
tions, 83 HARV. L REv. 1370 (1970).
42. Again, the standards vary considerably from state to state, usually specifying a
maximum dollar-value for real property (excluding the residence), personal property,
and financial assets.
43. Federal regulations require only that the applicant make a declaration of
eligibility to begin to receive benefits. 45 C.F.R. § 205.20 (1972). Since the Supreme
Vol. 1973:469]
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The work requirement of the AFDC-U program has also been inef-
fective in the case of strikers. Unlike the financial requirements, the
work requirement is outlined by the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare (HEW). 44  The present standard permits aid to be
granted if the "father has not vwithout good cause, within such 30-
day period prior to the receipt of such aid, refused a bona fide offer
of employment or training for employment."" In many cases, work
is' not available for strikers; in others, the work requirement is not
enforced.4" Congress apparently did not consider whether a striker
is a person who "refused" work "without good cause." A sponsor of
the 1961 amendment emphasized that Congress intended to provide
assistance only to the "involuntarily unemployed"47-but this is no
more satisfactory than the "good cause" criterion. 4  HEW's "good
cause' standard has not been improved by state statutes, none of which
expressly grants or denies AFDC-U benefits to strikers. Instead of
clarifying the work requirement, HEW has added to the confusion by
Court's decision in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), states cannot impose
waiting-period requirements on applicants who move into the jurisdiction. Generally,
the great number of eligible recipients created by a strike is more than state welfare
administrators can effectively investigate and process. Welfare for Strikers 92-96 pro-
vides detailed discussion of the administrative headaches created by striker-applicants,
and concludes that the asset requirements are generally ineffective because: (1) the
requirements "are not suited to measuring the real extent of a strikers need," id. at 92;
(2) strikers are often exempted from some of the requirements; and (3) "the procedures
for administering the current AFDC-U program are ill-suited for properly dealing with
strikers." Id. at 93.
44. 45 C.F.R. § 233.100(a)(3)(ii) (1972); see 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(F) (Supp.
I, 1972). Prior to 1967 the work requirement was left to the discretion of the
states. See H.R. REP. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 107-08 (1967); S. PRP. No.
744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 160 (1967).
45. 45 C.F.R. § 233.100(a)(3)(ii) (1972).
46. See Welfare for Strikers 91-92. The author suggests that, although strikers
are required to register for alternative work, the requirement is not effective because most
employers will not hire men for a short-and unpredictable-time, and because many
administrators will "not require a worker to accept a job that would jeopardize his
union standing." Id. at 91.
47. 107 CONG. Ruc. 3767 (1961) (remarks of Cong. Byrnes). See also H.R.
REP. No. 1414, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1962).
48. See Welfare for Strikers 89 n.59:
The use by Congress of the term "involuntary" is significant only because it
did not depart from common usage. As a basis for distinguishing between
eligible and ineligible unemployed, however, the term is inadequate. A mem-
ber of a giant union such as the United Auto Workers is hardly free to choose
whether or not to strike. And the term invites an arbitrary distinction
between a strike which is voluntary union action, and a lockout, which causes
involuntary unemployment for union members.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss3/1
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approving both state administrative regulations that declare strikers
to be "employed" and those that declare them to be "unemployed." 4
Opposition to the widespread use 0 of the public assistance system
49. HEW has general authority to review state administrative regulations which
interpret state AFDC-U statutes. 42 U.S.C. § 602(b) (1970); see 45 C.F.R. § 201.3
(1972). Of the fifty states and the District of Columbia, only twenty-nine partici-
pate in the AFDC-U program: Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46-292 (Supp. 1972);
CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 11200-507 (Deering Supp. 1972); COLO. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 119-9-1(4)(b) (Supp. 1967); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 504(2) (Supp.
1970); D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-202(a)(4) (1966); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.225 (1973);
HAwAIx REV. STAT. §§ 346-55 (Supp. 1972); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 4-1.1 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-709(D) (Supp. 1972); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, §§ 3741-56 (1964, Supp. 1972); MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 45(c)
(1969); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 118 (Supp. 1972); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 16.456
(Supp. 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN § 256.73 (1971); Mo. REv. STAT. § 208.041 (Supp.
1973); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 71-501 to -510 (1971); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-504
(Supp. 1969); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 44:10-1(c) (Supp. 1973); N.Y. Soc. SRv. LAw
f§ 343-62 (McKinney 1966, Supp. 1972); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 5107.03(A)
(Page Supp. 1972); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 56, § 164(d) (1969); ORE. REv. STAT.
1§ 418.035-.145 (1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 201 et seq. (1968); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 55-15-23(c)(1) (1963); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 2701(1) (Supp. 1973); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 63.1-105 to -126 (1950, Supp. 1973); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. §
74.12.010 (Supp. 1972); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-1-2(c) (Supp. 1972); WiS. STAT.
ANN. § 49.19 (1957, Supp. 1973).
Only Oregon automatically disqualifies strikers. Kansas and Nebraska generally
deny benefits to strikers but make an exception in the case of a lockout. Maryland
denies benefits to strikers who are disqualified from unemployment compensation.
Delaware and Pennsylvania deny benefits to strikers who are engaged in illegal strikes.
Minnesota has not yet assisted workers during a strike. Apparently, the other states
automatically pay benefits. Letter from Thomas Scarletter, Attorney, HEW, to Jean
Rogers, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Md., Nov. 29, 1971. In 1967
the Senate defeated a proposal that would have made the AFDC-U program manda-
tory. 113 CoNo. REC. 33,195 (1967). For a detailed discussion of the various pro-
grams and agencies in all fifty states, see U.S. DEP'T OF HEW, COMPILATIONS BASED
ON CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PLANS (1970).
Technically, applicants for AFDC-U are required to wait thirty days before re-
ceiving benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 607(b)(1)(A) (1970). Some states waive this provi-
sion, in effect, by paying general assistance benefits during the waiting period. Welfare
for Strikers 104 n.153. Other states grant immediate benefits under a special emer-
gency AFDC-U program. 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1970). Moreover, a few strikers have
received benefits under the section of the AFDC statute which provides payments to
families for foster home care of dependent children. 42 U.S.C. § 608 (1970). See
THEBLOT & CowiN 11 n.6.
50. For a detailed empirical analysis of the use of tax-supported welfare payments
to strikers, see THIEBLOT & CowIN 49-185. The authors present a number of case
studies and statistics which demonstrate the prevalence of striker use of the various
programs. For example, the authors, citing REsEARCH & STATISTICS DIV., UTAH STATE
DEP'T OF HEALTH & WELFARE, RE STAT REPORT (1968), indicate that during the
copper strike of 1967-1968, almost 600 strikers received over $400,000 in welfare
479
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to subsidize strikers was slow to develop.51 In Strat-O-Seal Manufac-
turing Co. v. Scott52 taxpayers brought an action to enjoin the Illinois
Department of Public Aid from paying general assistance benefits to
strikers and AFDC-U benefits to strikers' children. The taxpayers ar-
gued that strikers are not "persons who for unavoidable causes are
unable to maintain a decent and healthful standard of living,"5" as re-
quired by state statute, and should be disqualified by the provision
that "any employable person who refuses suitable employment or
training for self-support work shall not receive general assistance. 14
Similarly, the taxpayers contended that children of strikers should be
denied AFDC-U benefits because strikers, by voluntarily walking off
their jobs, had "refuse[d] without good cause . . . to accept employment
in which . . they are able to engage. ' 5  The statute left to the ad-
ministrative agency the task of defining "good cause," ' and since 1950
the Illinois Department of Public Aid had permitted general assistance
payments to strikers. 57 Nevertheless, the taxpayers argued that strikers
and their families should be disqualified from receiving welfare just
as they were disqualified from receiving unemployment compensa-
tion.5 8 The court rejected the analogy, drawing a distinction between
the two types of subsidy: "Compensation is generated through lack
of work with economic need purely incidental thereto. Assistance is
triggered by economic need with lack of suitable work incidental there-
benefits administered by the state of Utah, 40% of this amount coming from state
taxes. THmEBLOT & CowiN 49-51. During the Westinghouse strike of 1970-1971,
strikers received an estimated $2.5 million in total benefits, including food stamps,
general assistance, and AFDC-U. An average worker could receive about 65% of
his pre-strike net income from these benefits, without resort to his union's strike
fund. Id. at 82-101. And in the General Motors strike of 1970, the state of Michigan
dispensed over $14.3 million in AFDC cash payments and over $692,000 in state gen-
eral assistance to strikers. The authors estimate that a total bill to the public of $30
million for all forms of assistance was paid in all states involved. Id. at 102-42.
51. Indeed, the first legal attack on the provision of the older AFDC benefits to
strikers did not come until 1959. State v. Montana Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 136 Mont.
283, 347 P.2d 727 (1959).
52. 72 Ill. App. 2d 480, 218 N.E.2d 227 (1966).
53. Law of Aug. 4, 1949, § 4-1, [1949] Ill. Laws 417 (repealed 1967).
54. Law of June 19, 1957, § 1, [1957] Ill. Laws 722 (repealed 1967).
55. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 605.3 (Smith-Hurd 1965), as amended, ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 23, § 11-20(3) (Supp. 1973).
56. Id.
57. Illinois Attorney General, Opinion (May 27, 1950) (unpublished) (general as-
sistance available for strikers); see [1962] ILL. ATT'Y GEN. REP. 189 (AFDC-U available
for strikers).
58. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 434 (Smith-Hurd 1971).
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to." '  The court then addressed the most basic question: Did the
state legislature intend to disqualify strikers from welfare bene-
fits as well as from unemployment compensation? The court noted
that general assistance had been paid to strikers since an opinion of
the state attorney general in 1950,00 and that the legislature had acqui-
esced in this interpretation of the statute for fifteen years. 61 Although
the attorney general's opinion was not binding, the court acknowledged
that it was "persuasive," '2 and held that although strikers are not out
of work for "unavoidable causes," they have not for "good cause"
refused an offer of employment. 3 This holding appeared to be based
less on the court's determination of the purpose of the statute than on
the court's view of labor economics. The court noted that "labor un-
ion membership or activity and the right to strike in proper cases and
under proper circumstances is an accepted fact in our industrial com-
munity,"6 and that to deny welfare benefits to strikers would be "to
strangle otherwise authorized activity"'65 by interjecting the state into
labor disputes. A striker's unemployment is avoidable, the court
said, "only if it may be said that it can be avoided by abdicating the
right to participate in a proper strike . . . . To so hold is to place
a hangman's noose over an existing right when the legislature has not
specifically done so."66
59. 72 Ill. App. 2d at 483, 218 N.E.2d at 229. The court's statement implies that
there is little connection between a welfare recipient's poverty and his lack of employ-
ment, and little connection between an unemployed person's lack of employment and
his need for financial assistance. An attempt by the state of California to argue that
the distinction between welfare benefits and unemployment compensation warranted
terminating unemployment compensation-but not welfare benefits-without a hear-
ing, was characterized by Justice Douglas as
surprisingly disingenuous. First it seeks to distinguish Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, on the ground that "welfare is based on need; unemployment
insurance is not." But that simply is not true, for the history makes clear
that the thrust of the scheme for unemployment benefits was to take care of
the need of displaced workers, pending a search for other employment.
California Dep't of Human Resources Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, 135 (1971) (Douglas,
J., concurring).
60. See note 57 supra.
61. 72 Ill. App. 2d at 483-85, 218 N.E.2d at 229-30. The court also noted that an
unsuccessful attempt had been made during this interval to incorporate into the wel-
fare statute the striker disqualification which appeared in the unemployment com-
pensation statute. Id. at 483-85, 218 N.E.2d at 229.
62. Id. at 485, 218 N.E.2d at 230.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 486, 218 N.E.2d at 230.
66. Id. at 485-86, 218 N.E.2d at 230-31. The court's view of the taxpayers' ar-
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Strat-O-Seal set a pattern for both the arguments and the court's
reasoning in the next case involving public subsidies for strikers. In
Lascaris v. Wyman 67 (Lascaris I) a county commissioner of the New
York Department of Social Services brought a declaratory judgment
action against the State Commissioner of Social Welfare seeking a
judicial determination of the right of strikers to receive state welfare
benefits. Again, the case turned on interpretation of a statute. As
in Strat-O-Seal, plaintiff argued that the plain language of the statute
disqualified strikers from receiving benefits, which are to be paid only
to "those unable to maintain themselves," and not to an "employable"
person who "has refused to accept employment for which he is
fitted." 68  As in Illinois, the New York Commissioner had made an
administrative determination that strikers were eligible for welfare ben-
efits, 9 and benefits had been paid accordingly since 1952. Unlike
Illinois, however, after the first seven weeks of a strike New York does
not disqualify strikers from receiving unemployment compensation. 0
The Lascaris I court based its decision to uphold the Commissioner's
practice of awarding benefits to strikers on two grounds. First, it stated
that the state welfare statute and the state labor statute's guarantee of
the right to strike must be read together, and that "strict and narrow
application . . . of the Social Welfare Law cannot be used to force
the employee back to work and to forfeit his rights under the Labor
Law."' 71  Secondly, it found in the legislature's acquiescence in the
Commissioner's administrative determination tacit approval of the policy
of providing welfare benefits to strikers. Again, however, a judicial
understanding of labor policy and economics appeared to prevail over
the expressed intent of the legislature, as manifested in the language
gument is an indication of its attitude toward the role of relative economic strength at
the bargaining table: "Plaintiffs would have us hold that you can participate, or
acquiesce in a strike at the place of your employment only if you can initially afford
it and then only as long as you can continue to afford it." Id.
67. 61 Misc. 2d 212, 305 N.Y.S.2d 212 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
68. N.Y. Soc. SEnv. LAw § 131 (McKinney 1966), as amended, (Supp. 1972).
69. 61 Misc. 2d at 215, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 216.
70. N.Y. LABoR LAw § 592 (McKinney 1965). See also id. § 593(2)(b), which
provides that "no refusal to accept employment shall be deemed without good cause, nor
shall it disqualify any claimant otherwise eligible to receive benefits if there is a
strike, lockout or other industrial controversy in the establishment in which the em-
ployment is offered."
71. 61 Misc. 2d at 215, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 216-17. The right to strike is guaranteed
by N.Y. LABOR LAw § 713 (McKinney 1965); accord, 29 U.S.C. § 157, 163 (1970).
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of the statute.72
After Lascaris I the New York legislature amended the state public
assistance statute by adding a detailed list of circumstances in which
a person is not to be deemed "employable' ' 73 and thus exempt from
the requirement to accept work. The list did not include persons par-
ticipating in a labor dispute. In July 1971 the Communications
Workers of America (CWA) called a nationwide strike against the
New York Telephone Company. Although a settlement was reached
between the employer and the national union, several local CWA
chapters in New York refused to ratify the agreement and continued
their strike. Consequently, in Lascaris v. Wyman74 (Lascaris II)
Commissioner Lascaris, who was nothing if not persistent, again un-
successfully sought a declaratory judgment upholding his decision not
to pay welfare benefits to strikers. The trial court granted Lascaris'
request for a preliminary injunction prohibiting the State Commissioner
of Social Welfare from terminating state financing of the county wel-
fare system7" in response to Lascaris' refusal to pay benefits to strik-
ers. The court later granted summary judgment for plaintiff 6 on the
ground that strikers are "employable" persons who refuse to accept
employment. The court pointed out that the state legislature must
have been aware of Lascaris I and that its failure to include persons
involved in a labor dispute as "unemployable" persons indicated its
intention to disqualify such persons from receiving welfare benefits. 77
72. 61 Misc. 2d at 215, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 217.
73. Law of May 24, 1971, ch. 298, § 5, [1971] N.Y. Laws 942, amending N.Y.
SOc. SERV. LAw § 131(4) (McKinney 1966).
74. 68 Misc. 2d 523, 327 N.Y.S.2d 379 (Sup. Ct. 1971), rev'd, 38 App. Div. 163,
328 N.Y.S.2d 289, a!f'd, 31 N.Y.2d 386, 292 N.E.2d 667, 340 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1972).
Plaintiff did not contest paying benefits to the families of strikers.
75. 78 L.R.R.M. 2531 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971). The court indicated that, in view
of the 1971 amendment to the Social Services Law, it was doubtful that Lascaris I
was still good law, particularly since there was a serious question as to the le-
gality of the continued strike. Noting that in ruling on the request for a pre-
liminary injunction it was obligated to balance the equities, the court held that the
equities favored granting an injunction until the case was decided on the merits be-
cause to do otherwise would jeopardize the entire public assistance program in the
county, and because "if the plaintiff grants public assistance to the strikers and it is
ultimately determined that they were not entitled thereto, considerable doubt exists as
to whether the plaintiff would be able to recover the amounts paid to each individual."
78 L.R.R.M. at 2532.
76. 68 Misc. 2d 523, 327 N.Y.S.2d 379 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
77. Id. at 525, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 381.
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The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court unani-
mously reversed the trial court in Lascaris II and awarded summary
judgment for defendant.7" The court held that a striker, both before
and after the 1971 amendment to the Social Services Law, was an
"employable individual," but that he was not disqualified for refusing
employment with his struck employer. Without reference to legislative
history, the court concluded that the legislature could not have
intended that such a refusal by a striker to work for his employer would
serve as the basis for denial of public assistance. To so hold would
subject union employees to union sanctions if they refused to obey strike
orders and denial of welfare benefits if they did [obey], and would thus
be tantamount to a denial to them of their right to strike guaranteed
them under federal and state law . . .7
Thus the implicit threat of union sanctions renders a striker's decision
to remain on strike "involuntary." The court emphasized that the leg-
islature did not disqualify from unemployment compensation employ-
ees who refused to accept work in an establishment which was the
site of a labor dispute, 0 and that, similarly, the legislature probably
did not intend to make refusal of employment in a struck establishment
grounds for disqualification from welfare.81 The court also noted that
strikers had traditionally received welfare benefits under New York
law and that other states paid welfare to strikers.82 Since the 1971
amendment merely enumerated certain classes of "unemployable" per-
sons, it was not applicable to strikers; since the legislature did not
expressly remove strikers' eligibility, the court held that the legislature
had, in effect, endorsed the administrative policy upheld in Lascaris 1.
78. 38 App. Div. 163, 328 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1972).
79. Id. at 166, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 293. Since the Supreme Court has sanctioned
the union practice of fining, with an implicit threat of expelling, a union member who
refuses to honor an authorized strike, NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S.
175 (1967), it may be argued that the refusal of a union member-employee to work for
his employer during a strike is not "voluntary." But more recent cases weaken this
argument; if the employee resigns from the union, at least if there is no express
limitation on his right to resign in the union by-laws, an attempt by the union to fine
him for returning to work constitutes an unfair labor practice. Booster Lodge No. 405,
Int'l Machinists v. NLRB, 412 U.S. 84 (1973) (per curiam); NLRB v. Granite State
Joint Bd., Textile Workers Local 1029, 409 U.S. 213 (1973). See generally Summers,
The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact, 70 YALE L.J. 175 (1960).
80. 38 App. Div. at 166-67, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 293.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 167, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 293. The court listed eleven major New York
strikes in which benefits had been paid. Id. at 167 n.5, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 293 n.5.
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The Appellate Division rejected plaintiff's argument that payment
of benefits violates the state's traditional policy of remaining neutral
in strikes, insisting that denial of benefits would assist employers and
thus itself not be "neutral." The neutrality argument, the court con-
cluded, cuts both ways and therefore should give way to "the broad
humanitarian policy clearly enunciated by the legislature" in the Social
Services Law. 3 Finally, the court held that the granting of state wel-
fare benefits to strikers is not preempted by federal regulation of col-
lective bargaining, and should not be conditioned upon the Social Wel-
fare Department's view of the lawfulness of a strike.84
83. Id. at 168, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 295, citing N.Y. Soc. SEnv. LAw § 131(1)
(McKinney Supp. 1972), which provides, in part:
It shall be the duty of social services officials, insofar as funds are available
for that purpose, to provide adequately for those unable to maintain them-
selves . . . . They shall, whenever possible, administer such care, treatment
and service as may restore such persons to a condition of self-support or self-
care, and shall further give such service to those liable to become destitute as
may prevent the necessity of their becoming public charges.
To avoid the apparent inconsistency between the legislature's withholding of unem-
ployment compensation during the first seven weeks of a strike, arguably to maintain
state neutrality for at least a substantive period, and the granting of welfare benefits
immediately, the court distinguished between the two kinds of subsidy:
Clearly, however, unemployment compensation and welfare assistance serve
different purposes. Public assistance is designed to supply unmet subsistence
needs while unemployment compensation is designed to cushion the shock of
seasonal, cyclical, or technological unemployment without reference to dem-
onstrated needs.
38 App. Div. at 168, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 294-95.
84. 38 App. Div. at 169, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 295. On the latter question, the court,
citing In re Heitzenrater, 19 N.Y.2d 1, 224 N.E.2d 72, 277 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1966), stated
that "our Court of Appeals has recognized that it is not appropriate or wise for a social
welfare agency to inquire into the legality of a strike, but suggests that the question of
'fault' in work stoppage is best left to federal and state labor boards especially qualified
to deal with them. . . ." The court thus left open the question whether a court might
determine that a particular strike is illegal and cut off welfare benefits. Such a deci-
sion might further complicate "neutrality" considerations.
New York, while allowing unemployment compensation benefits to strik-
ers after a statutory seven week waiting period, views the waiting period as
a manifestation of the neutrality of the state and as a method by which the
state avoids the imputation that a dispute may be financed through unem-
ployment compensation benefits. In re Ferrara's Claim, 10 N.Y.2d 1, 8,
176 N.E.2d 43, 47, 217 N.Y.S.2d 11, 15 (1961). It can also be argued, of
course, that the state is encouraging longer strikes by first providing aid at
the point where the strikers are most in need of it. How the state's neutrality
is preserved by denying benefits before a certain date but allowing them
thereafter is not explained. A more logical rationale for the legislature's
position is that the state would save a considerable sum, without undue harm
to the striker, by denying benefits for several weeks immediately after the be-
ginning of the dispute when the striker least needs supplemental benefits.
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The decision of the Appellate Division in Lascaris II was affirmed
by the New York Court of Appeals, 85 which held that strikers were
eligible for welfare benefits both before and after the 1971 amend-
ment to the Social Services Law. Like the Appellate Division, the
Court of Appeals suggested that either payment or non-payment of
benefits would violate the neutrality principle, 0 a position with some
philosophical merit but no historical validity. The court indicated that
it would not interpret the law as precluding payment of benefits to
strikers in the absence of a clear legislative intent to this effect.87  It
rejected plaintiff's preemption argument on the grounds that there is
a question whether provision of subsidies has an impact on the collec-
tive bargaining system, and that in any event the state has sufficient
interest in "providing welfare for its needy citizens" that the court
would not find this practice precluded by the preemption doctrine in
the absence of a clear showing that Congress specifically intended "to
deprive the State of the power to serve that interest . . . even if such
aid has some impact on national labor policy."88
A separate attempt to adjudicate the right of New York strikers to
receive welfare benefits was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction in Russo
v. Kirby.89 Striking CWA members filed a class action in federal
court challenging the refusal of another county commissioner of the
New York Department of Social Services to pay them welfare benefits.
The district court granted a preliminary injunction,"0 basing its juris-
The position of the New York courts illustrates the lack of logic inherent
in the arguments of state neutrality and public financing of strikes. While
these arguments may serve as rationalizations for the legislature's action in
the face of a statutory mandate expressly denying benefits to certain classes
of workers, as the unemployment compensation statutes generally do, they
should not be applied to welfare statutes containing no such statutory com-
mand.
Note, Welfare Assistance to Strikers in Need: The Protestant Ethic Revisited, 67 Nw.
U.L. REv. 245, 259 n.100 (1972).
85. 31 N.Y.2d 386, 292 N.E.2d 667, 340 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1972).
86. Id. at 395, 292 N.E.2d at 671-72, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 402. The court described
neutrality as "in reality, little more than an admirable fiction." Id.
87. Id. at 395-96, 292 N.E.2d at 672, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 403.
88. Id. at 397, 292 N.E.2d at 673, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 404.
89. 453 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.), rev'g 78 L.R.R.M. 2533 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
90. 78 L.R.R.M. at 2540-41. The injunction ordered the commissioner to cease
refusing applications from strikers, or disqualifying such applications, and ordered retro-
active payment to all strikers whose applications had been processed but later dis-
qualified. The court also waived the usual procedure of requiring the filing of a bond.
It did not address the problem of how welfare payments were to be recouped if it were
later determined that plaintiffs were not entitled to receive them.
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diction on a finding that the denial of benefits raised a substantial
federal question in view of the National Labor Relations Act's
(NLRA's)9' guarantee of the right to strike. Although Lascaris II
was pending, the district court in Russo refused to follow the absten-
tion doctrine by awaiting the state court's construction of the 1971
amendment to the Social Services Law. The district court held that
the strikers had a "fair chance of success for the ultimate relief
sought"92 on two grounds. First, under section 593(2) of the New
York Labor Law93 no individual is required to accept employment
in any establishment during a labor dispute on pain of losing unem-
ployment compensation. Reading the Labor Law in conjunction with
the Social Services Law, as required by Lascaris l, 94 if a refusal to accept
work in a struck establishment does not disqualify a striker from un-
employment compensation, it should not disqualify him from welfare
benefits.9 5 Secondly, section 131(4) of the Social Services Law90 does
not include a refusal to work during a strike in its list of situations
constituting a "refusal to accept employment.1
97
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed98 on the ground that
the district court lacked jurisdiction. The court indicated that for
jurisdiction to attach the case must arise directly under a federal law,99
91. Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68
(1970) [hereinafter cited as NLRA]. NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970), provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have
the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent
that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a
labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158
(a)(3).
Jurisdiction was thus based on 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970), without regard to the amount
in controversy. With regard to strikers whose benefits were terminated without a
hearing, jurisdiction was also based on 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970). See Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
92. 78 L.R.R.M. at 2538, quoting Sherman v. Posner, 266 F. Supp. 871, 873
(S.D.N.Y. 1966).
93. N.Y. LABOR LAW § 593(2) (McKinney 1965).
94. See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
95. 78 L.R.R.M. at 2538. The court was strangely silent about § 592(1) of the
Labor Law, which suspends payment of unemployment compensation benefits to strik-
ing employees for a seven-week period.
96. N.Y. Soc. SmEv. LAW § 131(4) (McKinney 1965).
97. Id. The court did not explain why it assumed that the list was intended to
be exclusive.
98. 453 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1971).
99. See Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLuM. L.
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and that "facts must be alleged to show that federal law in the particu-
lar case creates a duty or remedy."'100 The NLRA, said the court,
does not create a cause of action for denial of state welfare benefits.' 0 '
Further, the court dismissed as "insubstantial" the strikers' claim that
violation of their constitutional rights is a basis for jurisdiction.10 2 And
the court indicated that even if jurisdiction did exist, the facts presented
a "classic case for abstention.'10 3
In Francis v. Davidson04 a strikers' challenge to the denial of wel-
fare benefits was decided on the merits, the court finding jurisdiction
REV. 157, 165-69 (1953). See generally Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Require-
ment that a Case Arise "Directly" Under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 890 (1967).
100. 453 F.2d at 551, citing Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936);
Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505 (1900); T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu,
339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 915 (1965); Wechsler, Federal
Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Federal Code, 13 LAw & CONTEMP. PROn. 216
(1948).
101. 453 F.2d at 551.
102. Plaintiffs' argument that denial of welfare benefits to strikers violates equal
protection was dismissed on the ground that "the basis of classification is clearly not
unreasonable." Id. Plaintiffs' argument that withdrawal of benefits without a hearing
violates due process was dismissed on the ground that the dispute was purely one of
law, not of fact, and that therefore no hearing was required. Id. at 551-52. Actually,
jurisdiction probably could have been based on 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970), which pro-
vides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action au-
thorized by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, or-
dinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity se-
cured by. . . any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of
all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States;
(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any
Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights ....
Of course, to get jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) or (4) (1970), plaintiffs
would have had to allege a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
See Francis v. Davidson, 340 F. Supp. 351 (D. Md.) (three-judge court), aff'd without
opinion, 409 U.S. 904 (1972).
103. 453 F.2d at 552, citing Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970). See generally
Wright, The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37 TXAs L. REv. 815 (1959). The
court, in denying the district court's jurisdiction, did not reach defendant's claim that
paying welfare benefits to strikers conflicts with national labor policy.
104. 340 F. Supp. 351 (D. Md.) (three-judge court), aff'd without opinion, 409
U.S. 904 (1972).
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on the basis of alleged infringement of personal liberties and denial
of equal protection. 1° 5  Francis tied the strikers' right to receive
AFDC-U benefits to HEW policy. Maryland uniquely denies AFDC-U
payments to persons who are ineligible for unemployment compensa-
tion,"' including strikers. This policy was challenged on two grounds in
a class action brought by striking fathers. First, plaintiffs argued that by
denying benefits to strikers, Maryland violated the equal protection
clause. The court rejected this argument, holding, like the Russo
court, that "rational bases exist for Maryland's position denying
AFDC-[U] benefits to children of fathers who are out of work
because of labor disputes."'1 7  Secondly, plaintiffs claimed that Mary-
land's policy conflicted with an HEW regulation that required states,
pursuant to their AFDC-U authority, to define "unemployed" as in-
cluding "any father who is employed less than 30 hours a week.""0 "
The court held that Congress had empowered HEW "to require each
participating state (1) to include, or (2) to exclude from its respective
AFDC-[U] program those out of work because of involvement in labor
disputes, or (3) to leave that decision to each state."1°9  The regula-
tion in question, by mandating that all fathers who work under thirty
hours per week be regarded as unemployed, had the effect of prohibit-
ing the state from denying benefits to a striker who otherwise qualified.
Francis, although confirming the right of strikers to receive benefits
under present law, permitted HEW to reverse this policy by changing
its regulations. After the decision was affirmed by the Supreme
105. The court based jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970), see note 102
supra, concluding:
While ...the matter is not free from doubt, this Court, in the absence of
any clear guidance from the Supreme Court or from the Fourth Circuit,
adopts the approach followed in Johnson v. Harder, [438 F.2d 7 (2d Cir.
1971)] and holds that the alleged deprivation of AFDC-[U] benefits in this
case constitutes an allegation of infringement of personal liberties and that
the constitutional equal protection contentions advanced by plaintiffs herein,
while rejected, are not frivolous.
340 F. Supp. at 360.
106. MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 45(c) (1957); Social Services Administration,
Maryland Dep't of Employment & Social Services, Rule 200.X.A.(2).
107. 340 F. Supp. at 363. The court acknowledged that there were also "ra-
tional reasons for the opposite view which has been adopted by most of the states."
Id. The court listed the bases offered by the state to justify the policy: (1) harmony
of the state's unemployment compensation and AFDC-U programs; (2) discouragement
of voluntary unemployment; and (3) maintenance of governmental neutrality in eco-
nomic strikes. Id. at 363 n.22.
108. 45 C.F.R. § 233.100(a) (1971).
109. 340 F. Supp. at 367.
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Court, without opinion, 110 HEW promulgated a new regulation"' spe-
cifically giving to states participating in the AFDC-U program the op-
tion of providing a striker disqualification, as well as any of the dis-
qualifications frequently contained in state unemployment compensa-
tion laws. Thus the impact of Francis on state welfare administration
was obviated; without clear direction from Congress, HEW will leave
the striker eligibility question to the states."'
The most significant attack on the practice of supplying public as-
sistance to strikers came in ITT v. Minter."13  Plaintiffs, employers,
sought unsuccessfully to enjoin the Commissioner of the Massachusetts
Department of Public Welfare from making welfare benefits available
to striking employees." 4 The federal district court denied relief on
the grounds that the employers made no showing of irreparable injury
and lacked a reasonable chance of success on the merits."' The First
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed."'
Plaintiffs' major argument in Minter was that state subsidization
of strikers violates the preemption doctrine 17 by indirectly interfering
with the national policy of fre collective bargaining. Specifically,
plaintiffs contended that a federal policy of encouraging the settlement
110. 409 U.S. 904 (1972).
111. 38 Fed. Reg. 18,549 (1973), revising 45 C.F.R. § 233.100(a)(1) (1972):
[A]t the option of the State, such definition need not include a father whose
unemployment results from participation in a labor dispute or who is unem-
ployed by reason of conduct or circumstances which result or would result
in disqualification for unemployment compensation under the State's unem-
ployment compensation law.
112. For discussion of the effect of the new regulation on the preemption issue,
see notes 432-34 infra and accompanying text.
113. 318 F. Supp. 364 (D. Mass.), affd, 435 F.2d 989 (1st Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 933 (1971).
114. General Welfare and AFDC-U are available to qualifying strikers' families in
Massachusetts under MAss. GEN. LAws chs. 117 & 118 (Supp. 1972). Plaintiffs argued,
as taxpayers had in Strat-O-Seal, see notes 52-66 supra and accompanying text, that since
the state specifically prohibits unemployment compensation for strikers, MASS. GEN.
LAWs ch. 151A, § 25(b) (1965, Supp. 1972), welfare benefits should be prohibited as
well. The appellate court rejected the argument, first distinguishing the functions of the
two types of subsidy, and secondly pointing out that it "would not lightly expand the
legislature's expressed negative in one piece of legislation to constitute an unexpressed
proviso in another. Indeed, silence on an issue where a legislature has shown its ca-
pacity to speak is all the more significant." 435 F.2d at 995.
115. 318 F. Supp. 364 (D. Mass. 1970).
116. 435 F.2d 989 (1st Cir. 1970).
117. Id. at 991. See generally Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HAV.
L. REv. 1337 (1972); Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction
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of labor-management disputes by private bargaining, free of state in-
terference, is frustrated when the state provides economic assistance
to one party during a strike. The court noted that the problem of
a possible conflict between national labor policy and the administration
of state welfare laws is outside the scope of San Diego Building Trades
Council v. Garmon,118 "its ancestors and progeny," because this con-
flict does not involve attempted state regulation of an activity that
is "clearly or arguably 'within the compass' of sections 7 and 8 [of
the NLRA] and therefore within the sole jurisdiction of the [National
Labor Relations] Board," but constitutes only a "tangential frustration
of the national policy objective of unfettered collective bargaining." 11 9
To determine whether the state's activity should be preempted, the court
employed a "balancing process . . . in which both the degree of conflict
and the relative importance of the federal and state interests are as-
sessed.1' 20  In balancing these interests, the court stated that it must
look at the class of situation generally, rather than at the specific dis-
pute before it, "to determine the quantum of impact on collective bar-
gaining stemming from the granting of welfare benefits to strikers. 1 12
Factors to be assessed in balancing the conflicting interests include:
how many states permit strikers to receive welfare; whether or not strikes
tend to be of longer duration where welfare is received; any studies or
expert testimony evaluating the impact of eligibility for benefits on the
strikers' resolve; a comparison between strike benefits and welfare
benefits; the impact of the requirement that welfare recipients accept
suitable employment; how many strikers actually do receive welfare
benefits; and a host of other factors. In addition, the state's legitimate
interests must also be considered: its interests in minimizing hardship
to families of strikers who have no other resources than the weekly pay
check, its concern in avoiding conditions that could lead to violence,
its interest in forestalling economic stagnation in local communities,
etc.' 2
2
over Labor Relations: 1, 59 COLuM. L. REV. 6 (1959); Michelman, State Power to
Govern Concerted Employee Activities, 74 H,v. L. REv. 641 (1961); Note, Pre-
emption of State Labor Regulations Collaterally in Conflict with the National Labor
Relations Act, 37 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 132 (1968).
118. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
119. 435 F.2d at 992.
120. Id., citing Note, Federal Preemption: Governmental Interests and the Role
of the Supreme Court, 1966 Dut L.J. 484.
121. 435 F.2d at 993.
122. Id.
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Despite "the inadequacy of the evidence before the district court," the
appellate court held that granting welfare benefits does not sufficiently
frustrate federal collective bargaining policy, and that state interests
are not "so insubstantial compared to the federal interest," as to in-
yoke the preemption doctrine. 123
The Minter court believed that because of its complexity the preemp-
tion issue would be more appropriately considered by Congress than
by the courts, particularly since Congress is already involved in the
administration of welfare programs to the extent of establishing mini-
mum requirements for state welfare plans.2 4 Further, although the
court did not "attribute heavy weight to congressional silence," it stated
that it was doubtful that "if striker eligibility for welfare had a signifi-
cant impact on labor-management relations, Congress would be una-
ware of that impact."' 25
Another major effort to induce the courts to apply the preemption
doctrine to state subsidization of strikers by means of welfare payments
occurred in Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle.12°  In an effort
to surmount the objections raised by the Minter court concerning the
123. Id. at 994. The district court found that although granting welfare benefits
might give strikers some advantage in a labor dispute, its effect on labor-management
relations was "indirect and peripheral." 318 F. Supp. at 366. Although twenty-five
percent of the strikers had applied for welfare benefits, the appellate court stated,
"Our record is almost bereft of any indication of significant impact on either plaintiff.
. . . There is no evidence of any relationship between the availability of welfare
benefits to present or prospective striker recipients and the likelihood of prolongation
of either strike." 435 F.2d at 991 n.3. Neither court considered the possibility of
taking judicial notice of various economic literature setting forth the rather self-evi-
dent proposition that aid to one party in a strike has the effect of increasing the ability
and willingness of that party to continue the strike until the opposing party makes
concessions. See notes 369-78 infra and accompanying text.
124. 435 F.2d at 993-94.
125. Id. at 994. The court's reasoning is faulty on two grounds. First, since the
provision of public assistance to strikers did not commence until after 1961, at least
insofar as it involved federal funds, it was impossible for the Taft-Hartley Congress, or
even the Landrum-Griffin Congress-both of them demonstrably more concerned with
labor law than post-1961 Congresses-to have taken note of the impact of public sub-
sidies on strikes. Secondly, the events of the last decade have proven rather con-
clusively that Congress does not have cognizance of a number of factors-for example,
in foreign affairs-which one might expect it to.
The court also indicated that Congress was left free to provide specifically for pre-
emption if the Minter decision met with its disfavor. See Penn Dairies v. Milk
Control Comm'n, 318 U.S. 261 (1943). Of course, this argument cuts both ways.
126. Civil No. 853 (D.NJ., July 13, 1971), appeal dismissed as moot, 469 F.2d 911
(3d Cir. 1972).
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absence of evidence indicating that the payment of welfare benefits
to strikers has a substantial impact on the collective bargaining process,
employers sought to put expert testimony'127 into evidence. The dis-
trict court inexplicably refused to admit the proffered testimony and
denied plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction.
Plaintiffs' appeal was held by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
to be mooted by the settlement of the strike.12 8  The court reasoned
that with the termination of the strike the employers' contention that
the provision of welfare benefits to strikers is unconstitutional was
rendered moot unless it fell within either of two theories: (1) the
"continuing effects" theory, in which the injury to the claimant con-
tinues after the specific object of litigation is no longer obtainable; 29
or (2) the so-called Southern Pacific theory, in which short-term gov-
ernment actions may be litigable after their cessation if they are "cap-
able of repetition, yet evading review."' 30  The court believed, how-
ever, that Local 8-6, Oil Workers v. Missouri'3' requires that in all
labor cases "settlement of the underlying labor dispute, absent special
circumstances, requires a holding of mootness.' 32  The court's inter-
pretation of Oil Workers has not been followed in other strike subsidy
cases,' 3 3 but will make it difficult to adjudicate the subsidization ques-
tion on the merits in the Third Circuit.
Thus state provision of welfare benefits to strikers has not been
successfully challenged; indeed, in Francis the denial of benefits was
held contrary to federal policy under the special circumstances pre-
sented by Maryland's welfare regulations. 134 Provision of welfare ben-
efits to strikers has resisted claims that it is contrary to the intent of
state legislatures, inconsistent with the denial of unemployment com-
pensation benefits under identical circumstances, inconsistent with the
principle of governmental neutrality in labor disputes, and violative of
the preemption doctrine. In addition, challenges to subsidization may
127. The testimony was to be that of Professor Herbert R. Northrup of the Wharton
School of Finance who had directed the study by Thieblot and Cowin on the effects of
payment of public subsidies to strikers on the collective bargaining system.
128. 469 F.2d 911 (3d Cir. 1972).
129 E.g., Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 375-76 (1963).
130. Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 516 (1911).
131. 361 U.S. 363 (1960).
132, 469 F.2d at 922.
133, E.g., Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, 475 F.2d 449 (1st Cir. 1973); ITT v. Minter,
435 F.2d 989 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 933 (1971).
134. See notes 104-12 supra and accompanying text.
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face unresolved problems of federal jurisdiction and mootness raised
by Russo and Super Tire, respectively.
II. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
A second source of public subsidies for strikers is the unemploy-
ment compensation system. Technically, unemployment compensation
is a subsidy provided at the expense of employers rather than the gen-
eral public since unemployment benefits are paid from a state fund
financed by employer payroll taxes.18 As a practical matter, however,
these subsidies are provided at the expense of the public since the costs
of unemployment compensation are passed on to the consuming public
by employers in the form of higher prices.
With the enactment of the National Health Insurance Act80 in
1911, Great Britain became the first industrial nation to adopt a na-
tional unemployment compensation system. The system was financed
by contributions from employers, workers, and the government.187 The
adoption of a similar system in the United States was initially opposed
by organized labor, both because workers feared that they would be
required to contribute to the fund, and because of the prevailing philos-
ophy of "voluntarism," under which labor believed in non-intervention
by the government in labor affairs.1 8 Prior to the Depression, some
corporations had established, either unilaterally or through collective
bargaining, company unemployment insurance plans. Most of these
plans failed, however, during the Depression.'30 State efforts to provide
aid for the unemployed were also generally unsuccessful. Proposed
legislation based on contribution and insurance principles, after the
British model, failed to pass in New York and Ohio. In 1932 Wis-
135. The Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-11 (1970, Supp. II,
1972), imposes an excise tax on employers. Payments to an unemployment fund of a
state pursuant to a certified unemployment compensation law may be credited against
the federal tax. Id. § 3302. The criteria for approval and certification of state
plans by the Secretary of Labor are found at id. § 3304.
136. National Insurance Act of 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 55. See generally J. HARRIS,
UNEMPLOYMENT AND PoLIcs: A STUDY iN ENGLISH SocIAL POLICY 1886-1914, at
295-334 (1972).
137. See I. BERNSTEiN, THE LEAN YEARs: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER
1920-1933, at 489 (1960). See generally Larson & Murray, The Development of
Unemployment Insurance in the United States, 8 VAND. L. REv. 181 (1955).
138. L BERNSTEnN, supra note 137, at 347-54.
139. Id. at 184-85, 489-90. The total number of workers covered by employer,
union, and negotiated plans never exceeded one percent of the total labor force. Id.
at 490.
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consin established the first system of unemployment compensation re-
serves, but it never became fully operative.1 40
The American Federation of Labor's (AFL's) traditional belief in
voluntarism, fostered by a distrust of government and a view of all
forms of subsidy as doles, came under increasing pressure during the
early years of the Depression. At the same time, the self-reliant trade
unions, which had been the backbone of the early labor movement
in the United States, were unable to cope with the massive problems
of unemployment and declining wage levels and the desperation
strikes of 1930-1931. In November 1932 the AFL officially en-
dorsed a government unemployment insurance program to be adminis-
tered by the states with federal assistance. The program included a
provision that benefits were not to be denied any employee solely be-
cause of his participation in a strike.' 41
The Democratic Party platform in 1932 called for a national solu-
tion to the problem of deprivation arising from widespread unemploy-
ment.' 42 The result, after considerable compromise, was passage of the
Social Security Act"4 3 in 1935. The Act established a system adminis-
tered on a state-by-state basis with some federal financing from the col-
lection of an excise tax on employers. 44  The states were permitted to
collect an additional tax from employers whose employees collected
140. Id. at 492-501. New York's proposed plan did not contemplate providing un-
employment benefits to strikers. A faction of the AFL voluntarists in New York
supported payments to strikers, which stiffened opposition of employers to the entire
concept of unemployment insurance. The resulting split enabled the conservative oppo-
sition to keep the bill in committee. Id. at 492-96.
In Ohio, a commission studied alternative methods of providing assistance and
recommended a compulsory insurance system. A bill reflecting the study never got
out of committee. See REPORT OF THE Orno COwMssION ON UNEmPLoymNT COm-
PENSATION (1932).
In Wisconsin, legislation based on a "jobless reserve system," without contribution
from either employees or the government, was passed in 1932, Act of Jan. 28, 1932,
ch. 20, [1931] Wis. Laws Spec. Sess. 57, but operation was delayed, and then aban-
doned, because of congressional consideration and passage of a federal social security
law. By requiring each employer to develop its own reserves, with the amount of the
contribution to depend on the employer's employment level, the plan was intended to
stabilize employment. See I. BERNSTEN, supra note 137, at 498-501. See generally
R. HOAR, WISCONSIN UNEMPLOYMENT INsURANCE (1934).
141. See I. BERNSTIN, supra note 137, at 345-53.
142. See A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 8, at 301 (1959).
143. Act of Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620, as amended, 42 U.&C. § 301
el seq. (1970).
144. Id. at §§ 901-02, 49 Stat. 639, as amended, 26 U.S.C. § 3302 (1970). See
note 135 supra.
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more than a given amount of benefits. 41 r To assist the states in draft-
ing legislation to implement the unemployment compensation system,
the Social Security Board, which was created as a general advisory
council on social security,1 40 composed several model bills. The bills
were based in large part on the British experience in administering
unemployment insurance.1 47  The model bill adopted in most states
contained a provision which served to disqualify workers whose un-
employment was "due to a stoppage of work which exists because of
a labor dispute.1 148  Other states excepted from disqualification em-
ployees out of work as a result of a lockout,' 4 or as a result of an
145. As a result, many states tax employers on the basis of an "experience rating,"
which reflects the amount of unemployment compensation paid during preceding
years to the employers' workers. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 204 (Cum. Supp. 1971);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 576 (Smith-Hurd 1966); Tnx. Rtv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
5221b-5(c) (1971, Supp. 1973).
146. See Act of Aug. 14, 1935, ch. 531, §§ 701-04, 49 Stat. 635.
147. See Shadur, Unemployment Benefits and the "Labor Dispute" Disqualification,
17 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 294, 294-95 (1950).
148. The bill provided, in part:
An individual shall be disqualified for benefits ... for any week with
respect to which the commissioner finds that his total or partial unemploy-
ment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute at
the factory, establishment or premises at which he is or was last employed:
Provided, That this subsection shall not apply if it is shown to the satisfaction
of the commissioner that-
(1) He is not participating in or financing or directly interested in the
labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work; and
(2) He does not belong to a grade or class of workers of which, imme-
diately before commencement of the stoppage, there were members em-
ployed at the premises at which the stoppage occurs, any of whom are
participating in or financing or directly interested in the dispute;
Provided, That if in any case separate branches of work which are
commonly conducted as separate businesses in separate premises, are con-
ducted in separate departments of the same premises, each such depart-
ment shall, for the purpose of this subsection, be deemed to be a separate
factory, establishment, or other premises.
SocL. SECURITY BOARD, DRAFT BILLs FOR STATE UNEMPLOYMENT ACOMPENSATION OF
THE POOLED FUND AND EMPLOYER RESERVE ACCOUNT TYPES § 1(5) (1936). For
examples of statutes modeled after this bill, see CAL. UNEP. INS. CODE § 1262 (Deer-
ing 1956); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3315(4) (1953, Supp. 1970); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26 § 1193(4) (Supp. 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 268.09(5) (Supp. 1973);
Mo. REv. STAT. § 288.040(5) (Supp. 1973); N.J. Rv. STAT. § 43:21-5(d) (Supp.
1973); N.Y. LABOR LAW § 592(1) (McKinney 1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 52-06-02
(4) (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 215(d) (1954); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 50.20.090 (1962); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 108.04(10) (Supp. 1973). See generally
D. NELSON, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE: TAm AMEmCAN EXPERIENCE 1915-1935
(1969).
149. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1105(f) (1960); COLO. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 82-4-9(1)
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employer's failure to observe state or federal labor regulations.1 50
The "labor dispute' disqualification was based on three rationales.
First, it was thought that to pay benefits to workers who were unem-
ployed due to their voluntary decision to advance their own economic
interests by striking would be contrary to the basic purpose of the
Social Security Act, which was to assist those individuals involuntarily
unemployed.'" Secondly, it was reasoned that for the government
to require an employer to finance a strike by his own employees vio-
lated governmental neutrality. 5 2 Finally, payment of benefits to strik-
ers was thought to place an overly severe demand on the unemploy-
ment compensation fund.15 3
The labor dispute disqualification established in the area of unem-
ployment compensation the basic principle that individuals whose un-
employment or need resulted from their efforts to further their eco-
nomic interests through the exercise of collective action were not to
receive subsidies at the expense of the public. As a corollary to this
principle, it was also established that individuals who were unemployed
as a result of a labor dispute in which they were not participating
were entitled to receive public subsidies because their unemployment
was involuntary. The first principle has generally prevented unemploy-
ment compensation from becoming a source of public subsidies for
strikers. There are, however, exceptions to this principle which permit
the use of unemployment compensation to subsidize strikers in certain
(1963): Ky. REV. STAT. § 341.360(1) (1969); MD. ANN. CODE art. 95A, § 6(e)
(1969): MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.531(8) (Supp. 1973); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §
4141.29(D)(1)(a) (Page Supp. 1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 802(d) (1964).
150. E.g., MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 87-106(d) (1964); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 21A-6-3 (Supp. 1972). See generally U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CoMPARISON OF STATE
UNEMPLOYMENT LAWS (1968).
151. Haynes v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 353 Mo. 540, 546-47, 183 S.W.2d
77, 81-82 (1944); see Emrick v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 53 Del. 561, 563-64,
173 A.2d 743, 745 (1961); Lawrence Baking Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n,
308 Mich. 198, 208, 13 N.W.2d 260, 263-64 (1944); cf. Haley v. Board of Rev., Div.
of Empl. See., 106 NJ. Super. 420, 426-27, 256 A.2d 71, 74-75 (1969).
152. Miville v. Maine Empl. Sec. Comm'n, 219 A.2d 752, 753-54 (Me. 1966);
Sweeney v. Board of Rev., Div. of Empl. See., 43 N.J. 535, 539, 206 A.2d 345, 347
(1965): In re Steelman, 219 N.C. 306, 310, 13 S.E.2d 544, 547 (1941); Marathon
Elec. Mfg. Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 269 Wis. 394, 404-05, 69 N.W.2d 573, 579-80
(1955): see Saunders v. Maryland Unempl. Comp. Bd., 188 Md. 677, 682, 53 A.2d
579, 581 (1947).
153. See Pribram, Compensation for Unemployment during Industrial Disputes, 51
MONTHLY LAB. REv. 1375, 1376 (1940).
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circumstances.5
The most significant exception to the principle occurs in New York
and Rhode Island. To prevent strikers from suffering too severely
in labor disputes, New York grants unemployment compensation to
strikers after a labor dispute has lasted seven weeks.l"s Rhode Island
does the same after six weeks. 1 6  In the past, Alaska,5 7 Louisiana,58
Pennsylvania,' 5" and Tennessee 01 have had similar provisions which
were repealed as a result of public pressure.
The next most serious deviation from the general principle of denying
unemployment compensation to participants in a labor dispute is
the so-called "fault" or "lockout" exception. A number of states
154. For example, under the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, 45 U.S.C.
§§ 351-67 (1970), striking railroad employees may receive unemployment compensa-
tion benefits unless "such strike was commenced in violation of the provisions of the
Railway Labor Act or in violation of the established rules and practices of a bona fide
labor organization of which [the employee] was a member." 45 U.S.C. § 354 (a-2)
(iii) (1970). See Brotherhood of Ry. & &S. Clerks v. Railroad Retirement Bd.,
239 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 133 (1938): "Thus, the un-
employment fund would become a strike benefit fund to a group directly responsible
for the stoppage of work, causing their unemployment as well as that of related
groups not directly involved in the strike." See also notes 148-50 supra and ac-
companying text.
155. N.Y. LABOR LAw § 592(1) (McKinney 1965). See In re Burger, 277 App.
Div. 234, 236, 98 N.Y.S.2d 932, 934 (1950), aff'd, 303 N.Y. 654, 101 N.E.2d 763
(1951): "The main purpose of section 592 is clear. The State is to stand aside for a
time, pending the settlement of differences between employer and employees, to avoid
the imputation that a strike may be financed through unemployment insurance bene-
fits." In In re Kelly v. Catherwood, 33 App. Div. 2d 830, 305 N.Y.S.2d 741 (1969),
ajf'd, 29 N.Y.2d 877, 278 N.E.2d 649, 328 N.Y.S.2d 442 (1972), the seven-week sus-
pension was held constitutional in the face of a union attack. The court pointed out:
These benefits are paid from the Unemployment Insurance Fund, to which
employers are the sole contributors . . . and to require employers to sub-
sidize wages lost by employees who are on strike or who have been locked
out would subvert the delicate balance of power existing between labor and
management upon which the collective bargaining process depends.
Id. at 831, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 743.
156. R.I. GEN. LAws ANx. § 28-44-16 (1969).
157. Law of Jan. 17, 1939, ch. 1, § 25, [1939] Alas. Laws 46 (repealed 1941)
(eight weeks).
158. Act of July 2, 1938, no. 164, [1938] La. Acts 394 (ten weeks), amended by
Act of June 30, 1940, no. 11, [1940] La. Acts 33 (repealed 1946) (three weeks).
159. Law of May 29, 1945, no. 408, § 9, [1945] Pa. Laws 1167 (repealed 1947)
(four weeks).
160. Act of March 10, 1939, ch. 131, § 8, [1939] Tenn. Pub. Acts 511 (repealed
1947) (four weeks).
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by statute'8 1 and two by judicial construction 62 have ruled that em-
ployees whose unemployment results from a lockout rather than a
strike are entitled to receive unemployment compensation. The justi-
fication for this exception is that workers unemployed as a result of
a lockout are not voluntarily unemployed in an effort to improve their
economic condition. 6 ' From an administrative point of view, this
exception is a nightmare because of the virtual impossibility in many
situations of distinguishing a strike from a lockout. 6 4  And the ad-
ministrative difficulty suggests a difficulty in principle as well. The
lockout is the employer's counterpart of the strike. With limited ex-
ceptions it is used defensively rather than offensively; that is, it is used
not to force a reduction in wage costs but to minimize increases in
wage costs. Whether a given dispute is a strike or a lockout depends,
then, on which of the two sides succeeds in landing its punch first.
Viewed in this light, an individual unemployed because of a lockout
is as much unemployed as a result of his efforts to improve his eco-
nomic condition as the individual who is unemployed as a result of a
strike. 6 '
161. See note 149 supra.
162. See Bunny's Waffle Shop, Inc. v. California Empl. Comm'n, 24 Cal. 2d 735,
151 P.2d 224 (1944), construing CAL. UNEP. INs. CODE § 1262 (Deering 1956);
Teamsters Locals 222 & 976 v. Board of Rev., Dep't of Empl. See., 10 Utah 2d 63,
348 P.2d 558 (1960), construing UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-4-5(d) (Supp. 1973). See
generally Lewis, The Lockout Exception: A Study in Unemployment Insurance Law
and Administrative Neutrality, 6 CALIF. W.L. REv. 89 (1969).
163. Lewis, supra note 162, at 112, points out that this justification was more applica-
ble to "earlier periods in American labor history."
164. Sce id.:
An even more difficult terrain for employment security commissioners, ref-
erees, appeals boards, and the courts to negotiate is the strike-lockout dis-
tinction. In most, if not all, litigated cases, elements of both forms of eco-
nomic warfare are present and with conflict inevitable, the thrust of the
lockout exception itself generates pressure on each disputant to behave in
such a way as to create the impression most favorable to it. The problem
is magnified for the employer and the claimant by court interpretations which
vary appreciably among the states as to the measure of responsibility for the
work stoppage, and as to which of the parties it is to be attached.
165. The fact that a lockout and a strike are economic counterparts was used by
employers in Holland Motor Express, Inc. v. Michigan Empl. Sec. Comm'n, 42 Mich.
App. 19, 201 N.W.2d 308 (1972), to support a claim that the lockout exception vio-
lates equal protection by imposing an arbitrary exception to the labor dispute dis-
qualification. The court upheld the lockout exception on the ground that the state
legislature had not acted arbitrarily in distinguishing between those who are voluntar-
ily unemployed and those who are involuntarily unemployed for the purpose of deter-
mining eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits.
Washington University Open Scholarship
500 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1973:469
A third deviation from the basic principle is the "establishment"
concept. The labor dispute disqualifications in all states limit disquali-
fication to situations in which the unemployment results from a labor
dispute at the "establishment" in which an individual works. 160 The
purpose of this limitation is to prevent the employee from losing
benefits because of the existence of a labor dispute at another establish-
ment in which he presumably has no interest. The problem with this
exception is that in some industries, specifically the automobile indus-
try, no "establishment" is complete in itself; rather, each plant is part
of a larger division. Accordingly, if employees strike at one plant,
they inevitably force the cessation of operations at other plants as well.
Historically, the United Auto Workers (UAW) has generally followed
a strategy of striking only a few key plants. This strategy eventually
forces the shutdown of the remaining plants but leaves workers in these
plants free to apply for unemployment benefits without being disquali-
fied under the labor dispute disqualification, even though their unem-
ployment is as much a result of their collective effort to improve their
economic condition as is the unemployment of the workers at the
plants which are actually struck. 1
Another significant deviation from the no-subsidy concept occurs
when employees have been laid off prior to the commencement of the
labor dispute.' 68 In these cases most courts and administrative agen-
cies have ruled that the workers' continued unemployment is due not to
the labor dispute but to the lack of work which originally caused their
layoff. 6 9 In so holding, courts and agencies have failed to recognize
that with the existence of the labor dispute these employees would not
166. See generally Lesser, Labor Disputes and Unemployment Compensation, 55
YALE L.L 167, 168 (1945).
167. See Park v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 355 Mich. 103, 94 N.W.2d 407 (1959).
Courts also disagree as to the meaning of "establishment;" for discussion of the pre-
vailing tests, see 58 MicH. L. Rnv. 1239, 1240 (1960). See generally Barker, Unem-
ployment Benefits in Labor Controversies: The Anachronisms of the Establishment
Doctrine, 16 BUFFALO L. Rnv. 715 (1967).
168. See Note, Effect of Participation in a Labor Dispute Upon Continuation of
Unemployment Benefits, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 738 (1967).
169. See, e.g., Ruberoid Co. v. California Unempl. Ins. App. Bd., 59 Cal. 2d 73,
378 P.2d 102, 27 Cal. Rptr. 878 (1963); Brechu v. Rapid Transit Co., 20 Conn.
Supp. 210, 131 A.2d 211 (1957); Muncie Foundry Div. of Borg-Warner Corp. v. Re-
view Bd. of Unempl. Sec. Div., 114 Ind. App. 475, 51 N.E.2d 891 (1943); Tucker v.
American Smelting & Refining Co., 189 Md. 250, 55 A.2d 692 (1947); American
Dredging Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Ed. of Rev., 208 Pa. Super. 451, 222 A.2d 449
(1966); cf. Fort Smith Chair Co. v. Laney, 238 Ark. 636, 383 S.W.2d 666 (1964).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss3/1
A STUDY OF SUBSIDIES FOR STRIKERS
return to work and, consequently, would remain unemployed after the
commencement of the dispute because of the dispute rather than the
original cause of the layoff."' If these employees participate in the
labor dispute by picketing or other action, they may lose their right
to receive benefits. 171 Of course, it would seem to be within the power
of the employer to prevent subsidies in this instance. Should the em-
ployer recall these employees to work, and should they refuse to cross
the picket line, it would then be evident that their unemployment from
the time of recall resulted from the existence of the labor dispute. Their
disqualification from unemployment compensation would presumably
follow. 172
Another departure from the no-subsidy policy occurs in the case
of employees who lose their positions as the result of their replacement
in the course of a labor dispute. 7 3  A number of courts have held
that an employee disqualified under the labor dispute provision be-
comes qualified for unemployment compensation benefits upon re-
sumption of production'7 4 in the plant in which he was employed or
upon his ultimate discharge. 75 Some cases still permit eligibility even
though the employee refuses to accept a re-employment offer from his
employer. 17  Since the continued unemployment of these employees
clearly is the result of a labor dispute, those courts and administrative
agencies which have, in effect, removed the disqualification upon the
170. For discussion of eligibility requirements for unemployment compensation for
employees who refuse to cross a picket line, see 44 IowA L. REv. 819 (1959); 37
NOTRE DAME LAW. 739 (1962). Normally, these employees are disqualified under either
the labor dispute disqualification or the voluntary leaving disqualification if their re-
fusal is the result of sympathy, but not if it is the result of fear. See, e.g., Shell Oil
Co. v. Cummins, 7 Ill. 2d 329, 131 N.E.2d 64 (1955); Meyer v. Industrial Comm'n,
240 Mo. App. 1022, 223 S.W.2d 835 (1949). When an employee refuses out of
sympathy, he, in effect, joins the strike, Kellogg Co. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 519 (6th
Cir. 1972), and payment of benefits to him would constitute a strike subsidy.
171. See Note, Effect of Participation in a Labor Dispute Upon Continuation of
Unemployment Benefits, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 738, 742-49 (1967).
172. See Merryman v. Administrator, Unempl. Comp. Act, 23 Conn. Supp. 233,
181 A.2d 260 (1962); Ablondi v. Board of Rev., 8 N.J. Super. 71, 73 A.2d 262
(1950); In re Sadowski, 257 App. Div. 529, 13 N.Y.S.2d 553 (1939); Mosko v. Un-
employment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 199 Pa. Super. 73, 184 A.2d 395 (1962).
173. See Mandelker, Refusals to Work and Union Objectives in the Administration
of Taft-Hartley and Unemployment Compensation, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 477 (1959).
174. E.g., Sakrison v. Pierce, 66 Ariz. 162, 185 P.2d 528 (1947); Lawrence Bakery
Co. v. Michigan Unempl. Comp. Comm'n, 308 Mich. 198, 13 N.W.2d 260 (1944).
175. E.g., Milne Chair Co. v. Hake, 190 Tenn. 395, 230 S.W.2d 393 (1950).
176. E.g., Barber v. California Empl. Stabilization Comm'n, 130 Cal. App. 2d 7,
278 P.2d 762 (1954).
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employer's resumption of production or replacement of the employee
seem to have misconstrued the labor dispute disqualification. From
a policy standpoint, however, it would seem that payment of benefits
under these circumstances would not be as harmful as in the other ex-
ceptions to disqualification because payment of benefits here does not
prolong the strike or upset the collective bargaining process, although
recognition by the employees that they can collect benefits in these cir-
cumstances might have these deleterious effects.
A final exception to the labor dispute disqualification is the "inter-
vening employment' exception. Although strikers generally make lit-
tle attempt to find other employment-since few employers desire to
hire employees who will quit upon termination of a strike, and since the
number of open jobs, particularly in small communities, is limited-some
strikers do secure temporary bona fide employment. Attempts by these
strikers to claim unemployment compensation upon termination of their
temporary employment have been defeated in most states on the ground
that this unemployment is really due to a labor dispute and not to the
layoff by the temporary employer. 177 As one court pointed out, to do
otherwise "would permit a striker to obtain any sort of temporary work
and when it was terminated to apply for benefits for the loss of the tem-
porary job even though the work stoppage still continued."'1 78 In Great
Lakes Steel Corp. v. Michigan Employment Security Commission 79 the
court adopted a contrary rule, thus extending an invitation to every
striker in Michigan to obtain "employment!' following commencement
of a strike and, after working at his new employment for a day, to
be "laid off" and thus be eligible for unemployment compensation.180
Among the first to accept the court's invitation to chicanery were em-
ployees of the Dow Chemical Corporation who, represented by the
United Steel Workers (USW), commenced an economic strike in early
1972. They then filed for unemployment compensation with the state's
Employment Security Commission, but were denied benefits under
177. See, e.g., Alin v. Alaska Empl. Sec. Comm'n, 17 Alas. 607 (1958); Hopkins,
Inc. v. California Empl. Comm'n, 24 Cal. 2d 744, 151 P.2d 229 (1944); Scott v.
Smith, 141 Mont. 230, 376 P.2d 733 (1962).
178. Alin v. Alaska Empl. Sec. Comm'n, 17 Alas. 607, 615 (1958).
179. 381 Mich. 249, 161 N.W.2d 14 (1968), affg 6 Mich. App. 656, 150 N.W.2d
547 (1967).
180. The court did not make clear whether the unemployment compensation so
payable was to be charged against the account of the interim employer or the struck
employer.
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Michigan's labor dispute disqualification.""' Following this action, a
number of employees secured temporary employment with other em-
ployers. In most cases the duration of this "employment" was one
day. After filing notice of termination of such "employment," the
strikers applied for and were granted unemployment compensation.
The Commission's decision to grant benefits to the USW is currently
being challenged in Dow Chemical Co. v. Taylor;8 2 if it is upheld
it will, in effect, eliminate the striker disqualification in Michigan.
The labor dispute disqualification and its exceptions have, at various
times in various states, led both management and labor to seek to ex-
tend or restrict the disqualification both by exerting political pressure
on state legislatures and by litigating. 83 The most significant legal
attack on the principle of subsidization came, not surprisingly, in Rhode
Island. In ITT v. Carter'8 4 the preemption argument was raised for
the first time to challenge payment of unemployment compensation
to strikers. The court's treatment of the argument was, even in terms
of the strike subsidy cases, both careless and unrealistic. In denying
the employer's request for an injunction against the payment of unem-
ployment benefits to striking workers, the court held that the state stat-
ute 85 authorizing the payments did not conflict with the NLRA's
protection of the right to organize for collective bargaining.186 The
court distinguished General Electric Co. v. Callahan,'8 7 which prohib-
ited inquiries into a labor dispute by a state arbitration board on the
ground that such inquiries constituted the type of coercion that the
Labor Management Relations Act' ss intended to eliminate, stating that
181. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.531(8) (Supp. 1973).
182. 57 F.R.D. 105 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (motion to dismiss denied). See notes 234-
37 infra and accompanying text.
183. See, e.g., In re George's Claim, 14 N.Y.2d 234, 199 N.E.2d 503, 250 N.Y.S.2d
421 (1964), in which an employer attacking New York's application of the establish-
ment concept apparently advanced the general argument that payment of unemploy-
ment compensation to strikers interferes with interstate commerce and is consequently
prohibited under the supremacy clause. The court rejected the argument, point-
ing out that the constitutionality of New York's unemployment compensation law was
upheld in W.H.H. Chamberlain, Inc. v. Andrews, 299 U.S. 515 (1937), as not in-
fringing on the federal commerce power and that, consequently, regulation of eligibility
for such benefit does not interfere with interstate commerce.
184. Civil No. 3770 (D.R.I., April 6, 1967).
185. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 28-44-16 (1969).
186. NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
187. 294 F.2d 60 (1st Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 832 (1962).
188. Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-44,
151-67, 171-87 (1970) [hereinafter cited as LMRAI.
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in Callahan "the State Board could clearly conflict with the policy of
free negotiations. It had direct coercive power. '' 180 Rather than
examine the extent of potential interference with free bargaining, as
the Callahan court had done,1 90 the Carter court viewed the removal
of subsidies as granting management an unfair advantage, namely, "the
pressure of economic insecurity due to the unemployment stemming
from the strike." '  That the imposition of such pressure is the heart
of the collective bargaining process was not considered. Furthermore,
the court indicated that the state has a valid and historical interest
in preventing the "health problems" which would be created by "strik-
ing employees' inability to feed their families."'192 Finally, the court
summarily dismissed the employer's contention that payment of unem-
ployment compensation to strikers violates the fourteenth amendment,
stating that the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of un-
employment compensation laws.193
In Aimacs, Inc. v. Hackett94 a group of employers sought to en-
join the Director of the Rhode Island Department of Employment
Security from paying unemployment compensation to their employees,
whose strike was approaching the six-week mark. The Almacs court
rejected the employers' preemption argument'"g and dismissed the case
on two grounds. First, the court held that Rhode Island's unemploy-
ment compensation statute is "part of a broad state-federal cooperative
effort to protect citizens against economic vicissitudes," and was not
intended to affect collective bargaining rights.196 Likewise, the court
found no evidence that the NLRA was intended to "override!' state
welfare laws, and noted increasing congressional financial support for
unemployment compensation programs both where benefits are paid
189. Civil No. 3770 (D.R.I., April 6, 1967).
190. See 294 F.2d at 67:
The obvious statutory purpose is to coerce agreement by invoking official
action to mold public opinion with respect to a labor dispute to the end of
bringing the pressure of public opinion to bear to force a settlement. This
is quite contrary to the national policy not to compel agreement but instead
only to encourage voluntary agreements freely arrived at after "good faith"
bargaining between the parties.
191. Civil No. 3770 (D.R.I., April 6, 1967).
192. Id.
193. Id., citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and Carmichael v.
Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937).
194. 312 F. Supp. 964 (D.R.I 1970).
195. See notes 117-25 supra and accompanying text.
196. 312 F. Supp. at 967-68.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss3/1
A STUDY OF SUBSIDIES FOR STRIKERS
to strikers and where they are not.'97 Secondly, the court found
that provision of unemployment compensation to strikers falls within
both exceptions to the Garmon rule. Although deciding the case on
the pleadings, the court held that the "imposition upon collective bar-
gaining power of the grant or denial of state benefits is speculative
and limited,"19 and thus within the "peripheral concern" exception. 199
And "the concern of the state for the well-being of its unemployed
and ultimately for the health of the local community is a most impor-
tant interest 'deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility,' "200 and
thus within the "local interest" exception.
The question should not be whether Congress indicated an express
intent specifically to prevent the use of unemployment compensation
to upset the balance of power in labor-management relations-almost
certainly it never considered this possibility-but whether Congress,
in enacting the NLRA, had a general purpose to establish a balance
of power and to exclude any state action which would alter that bal-
ance. Garmon makes clear that the particular intention of the state
law is irrelevant; if the effect of the law is to alter the balance created
by the NLRA, the law is deemed preempted.20 1
A final attack on the Rhode Island unemployment compensation
statute came in Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett.2 °0 Again, an employer re-
197. Id. at 968. The court reached this conclusion concerning congressional in-
tent without discussing any legislative history. H.R. REP. No. 245, supra note 31, at
12-13, in discussing an amendment to the Wagner Act, noted:
A few States pay strikers after the fifth, sixth, or seventh week of a strike.
This clearly is a perversion of the purposes of the social security laws, which
Congress intended to provide for unemployment compensation for those out of
work involuntarily and through no fault of their own. We therefore have
provided that a striker's status as an "employee" stops when he starts receiving
unemployment compensation from any State. He may receive relief from
his union, from local welfare funds, or from charity without losing that status.
See note 206 infra. See generally H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947)
(conference report); I & 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS ACT, 1947 (1947).
198. 312 F. Supp. at 968.
199. For further discussion of Garmon and its exceptions, see notes 398-434 infra
and accompanying text.
200. 312 F. Supp. at 968.
201. 359 U.S. at 244: "Regardless of the mode adopted, to allow the States to
control conduct which is the subject of national regulation would create potential frus-
tration of national purposes." Accord, Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v.
Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 292 (1971): "Pre-emption . . . is designed to shield the
system from conflicting regulation of conduct. It is the conduct being regulated, not
the formal description of governing legal standards, that is the proper focus of concern."
202. 344 F. Supp. 749 (D.R.I. 1972), rev'd, 475 F.2d 449 (1st Cir. 1973).
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quested an injunction restraining the state from paying unemployment
compensation benefits to the employer's striking workers. By intro-
ducing expert evidence,20 3 the employer sought to avoid the objection
raised in Minter that there was no evidence showing the impact
of striker subsidies on the collective bargaining process. But the court
denied relief on two contradictory grounds. First, relying on Minter,
it ruled that the issue of preemption should be resolved by Congress
and not by the courts.20 4 Secondly, it held that the state's interest
in providing for the welfare of its inhabitants is "so substantial that
this Court will not conclude that Congress has excluded such state
action. '20 5  The court indicated that it was influenced by Congress'
failure to adopt a recent proposal prohibiting states from granting un-
employment compensation to strikers.200 In a further contradiction,
the court also indicated that the case fell within the "local feeling"
exception to the Garmon rule.20 7
On appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and re-
manded.2 °8 First, the court held that the case was justiciable, pointing
out that while Minter had recognized that it would be preferable for
Congress to resolve the question of preemption, it did not preclude
judicial resolution of the question when presented in a particular
case.209 Unlike the Third Circuit in Super Tire,210 the court held that
203. It was stipulated that the strikers had received in one week a total of $31,190
in unemployment benefits-an average benefit of $77.20. Id. at 751.
204. Id. at 754.
205. Id.
206. In a message to Congress in 1969, President Nixon proposed legislation prohibit-
ing the New York-Rhode Island system of providing unemployment compensation to
strikers. See note 155 supra and accompanying text. The proposal was embodied in
H.R. 12,625, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), and rejected by the House Ways and Means
Committee on the implausible ground that management as well as labor preferred that
the matter be left to the states. See H.R. REP. No. 612, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 18
(1969).
An earlier attempt on the federal level to restrict unemployment benefits to strikers
also failed. Proposed House amendments to the NLRA contained a provision which
removed a striker's "employee" status in the event he received unemployment compen-
sation, although not if he received strike benefits, charity, or local welfare funds.
H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1947). The provision was not contained in the
Senate bill, S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), and was not enacted as part of the
LMRA. See note 194 supra.
207. 344 F. Supp. at 754.
208. 475 F.2d 449 (1st Cir. 1973).
209. Id. at 453-54.
210. See notes 126-33 supra and accompanying text. Grinnell followed Minter
in finding that the provision of benefits to strikers presents a recurring question
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although the strike which had given rise to the case had ended, the
case was not moot in view of the continuing nature of the problem.
Next, the court examined the history of congressional treatment of the
subsidization question in an effort to determine congressional intent.
The court noted that Congress had failed in enacting the Social Se-
curity Act to require disqualification for labor disputes,211 and that
a conference committee had dropped a provision contained in the orig-
inal Hartley bill212 which would have denied employee status to a
striker who accepted unemployment compensation. 1 3 The court also
made reference to Congress' refusals in 1969 and 1970 to accede to
President Nixon's request for legislation requiring the states to deny
unemployment compensation to strikers.214  Finally, the court recog-
involving significant public rights, and thus is within the ambit of Southern Pacific.
475 F.2d at 453-54.
211. 475 F.2d at 454-55:
Indeed, in detailing the requirements for state laws that would exempt em-
ployers from the federal unemployment tax, Congress specifically established
three conditions to insure the compatibility of state unemployment compensa-
tion laws with the then brand-new labor statute-unemployment compensa-
tion could not be denied to an otherwise eligible individual for refusing to
accept new work (1) if the position offered was vacant due directly to a labor
dispute, (2) if the wages for the offered job were substantially less favorable
than those prevailing locally for comparable work or (3) if a condition of the
offered employment was membership in a company union or resignation from
a bona fide union. [Social Security Act, now compiled in Federal Unem-
ployment Tax Act] § 903(a)(5), 49 Stat. 640, 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(5).
Certainly, had it thought it necessary to preserve its labor policy, Congress
could also have required state laws to bar payment of benefits to strikers.
Moreover, pursuant to § 3304(a) the Social Security Board, presumably aware
of the Congressional intent, approved, within the next few years, four state
laws which allowed payments to strikers.
212. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
213. 475 F.2d at 455.
214. See note 206 supra. The court quoted the following explanation for abandon-
ing the proposed requirement:
We have tried to keep from prohibiting the States from doing the things the
States believe are in the best interest of their people. . . . For example,
there are two States . . . which will pay unemployment benefits when em-
ployees are on strike . . . . [Ihf the State wants to do it we believe they
ought to be given latitude to enable them to write the program they want.
475 F.2d at 455, quoting 115 CONG. REc. 34,106 (1969) (remarks of Cong. Mills). But
the court believed that this explanation, by itself, was not sufficient to establish a clear
congressional purpose:
[i1n the absence of any floor amendment or debate related to that particular
change in either house, and of any real consideration of the issue at any level
in the Senate, we cannot take the House Committee's deletion, and Congress'
subsequent approval of the substitute bill, as a clear indication of the intent of
the entire Congress not to preempt unemployment payments to strikers.
475 F.2d at 456.
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nized the eligibility of strikers for benefits under the Railroad Unem-
ployment Insurance Act 215 and the Food Stamp Act of 1964.210 But the
court failed to find in this legislative history an unambiguous revelation of
intent and concluded, "The most that can fairly be said, in the face
of this legislative record, is that Congress has been and presently is
aware of the problem, has had the opportunity to resolve it, and has
acted in closely analogous circumstances. ' '217 Accordingly, the court
was left with the following questions: "[D]oes the payment of un-
employment compensation to strikers 'palpably infringe' upon federal
labor policy . . . and is the state interest in cushioning the impact
of unemployment stronger than the federal interest in untrammelled
collective bargaining?"218 It concluded that these questions could be re-
solved only on facts found by the district court and accordingly re-
manded.
In remanding, however, the Grinnell court gave the district court
a series of instructions which came close to directing the court to find
no preemption. With respect to the infringement issue, the appellate
court indicated that only evidence relating to the impact of unemploy-
ment compensation benefits in a strike situation was to be considered
since both welfare and food stamps, unlike unemployment compensa-
tion, are available immediately to strikers. 21 9 The court also noted
the absence of proof that a substantial number of strikers are eligible
for and receive unemployment compensation, and instructed the district
court to require a showing that provision of such benefits has an impact
on the length of strikes before finding an infringement on federal labor
policy.220 On the state interest question, the court was unwilling to
215. 45 U.S.C. § 354(a-2) (iii) (1970).
216. 7 U.S.C. § 2014(c) (1970).
217. 475 F.2d at 457.
218. Id.
219. Admittedly, some kind of adjustment should be made for the fact that unem-
ployment compensation benefits are not receivable for the first seven weeks of the
strike. It seems obvious, however, that evidence demonstrating the impact of any of
the types of subsidization would be equally probative of the impact of any particular
subsidy, since all of them increase the employees' economic power and thus influence
labor-management relations.
220. 475 F.2d at 457-58. The study by Thieblot and Cowin, note 2 supra, in-
troduced as an exhibit in the district court, appears strongly to demonstrate causation.
The court recognized that the provision of benefits might "produce higher settlements
with the generally attendant inflationary effects," but pointed out that in the strikes
studied by Thieblot and Cowin only seven to thirteen percent of strikers received unem-
ployment compensation, and that no statistical analysis comparing the length of strikes
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss3/1
A STUDY OF SUBSIDIES FOR STRIKERS
assume that the state's interest in providing unemployment compensa-
tion was the same as its interest in providing welfare benefits. The
purpose of welfare is ostensibly to alleviate "real hardship-serious
threats to the physical well-being, indeed in some cases survival, of
individuals," based on actual need, while the purpose of unemployment
compensation is to avoid "economic insecurity" or to insure "against
the temporary disruption of a flow of income." '' The waiting period
imposed by the unemployment compensation statute, the court sug-
gested, is "aimed at preserving the standard of living and meeting the
obligations previously undertaken with reasonable expectation that the
prior flow of income would continue. '222  Thus the state's interest
in unemployment compensation may be "narrower" than in welfare,
and "the secondary economic and social effects of unemployment pay-
ments or their absence' must be considered.223 These include "mini-
mization of violence in labor disputes" and "avoidance of economic stag-
nation in local communities. '' 224 But a finding that "a substantial
percentage of striking workers in Rhode Island would, if denied un-
employment compensation, qualify for public assistance '22  would
justify a conclusion that the state's interests in unemployment benefits
and welfare are "substantially the same," thus bringing the case within
Minter.-22 6
There have been two attempts in Michigan to invoke the preemption
theory to preclude payment of unemployment compensation to indi-
viduals involved in a labor dispute. In Holland Motor Express, Inc.
v. Michigan Employment Security Commission22 employers claimed
in New York and Rhode Island to states which do not provide unemployment benefits to
strikers was done. 475 F.2d at 458.
221. 475 F.2d at 459.
222. Id. at 460.
223. Id. at 460-61.
224. Id. at 461. See THMEBLOT & CowiN 207:
The contention seems to be that if tax supported payments to strikers are
provided, there will be a reduction in the manifest bitterness during the
strike and improved morale after it. There seems to be little empirical evi-
dence to support such reasoning. The Chicago Teamsters strike in 1970, the
New York Telephone strike of 1971-72, the Westinghouse strike . . . and
the Johns-Manville strike . . . are all examples of strikes marred by more than
ordinary violence, but also characterized by the use of public support funds
for strikers.
225. 475 F.2d at 460-61.
226. Id. No person can receive both welfare and unemployment compensation.
42 U.S.C. § 607(b)(2)(C)(i) (1970); 45 C.F.R. § 233.100(c)(1)(v)(b) (1972).
227. 42 Mich. App. 19, 201 N.W.2d 308 (1972).
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that payment of unemployment benefits to workers unemployed as a
result of a lockout frustrated the NLRA's protection of an employer's
right to lock out employees. Because unemployment benefits paid to
workers in Michigan are charged against their employers' accounts in
the unemployment compensation fund,228 the benefits are in effect sub-
sidized by the employers. This subsidization, argued employers, has
the effect of discouraging exercise of the right to lock out employees,
which is inconsistent with federal labor policy.229 The court rejected the
argument because unemployment payments are made directly by the
state, although an employer's taxes are increased with the paying out of
benefits to his employees, 230 and because the unemployment compensa-
tion system is designed to benefit the entire state by relieving the distress
of unemployment, regardless of the merits of the underlying labor dis-
pute.231  The court also rejected employers' argument that the legisla-
tive distinction2 32 between strikes and lockouts in determining eligibil-
ity for unemployment benefits violates equal protection. 3
228. MrcH. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.513-.522 (1968, Supp. 1973).
229. 42 Mich. App. at 28-30, 201 N.W.2d at 312-13. See NLRB v. Brown, 380
U.S. 278 (1965); NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local No. 449, 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
230. 42 Mich. App. at 30, 201 N.W.2d at 313, citing NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co.,
340 U.S. 361 (1951), and Lawrence Baking Co. v. Michigan Unempl. Comp.
Comm'n, 308 Mich. 198, 13 N.W.2d 265 (1944).
231. 42 Mich. App. at 27, 201 N.W.2d at 315.
232. MxcH. STAT. ANm. § 17.531(8) (Supp. 1973).
233. 42 Mich. App. at 28, 201 N.W.2d at 312. Employers' theory was that both
strikes and lockouts are "legitimate economic weapons," and that "there is no rational
basis for distinguishing between them with respect to disqualification for unemployment
benefits." Id. at 24, 201 N.W.2d at 310. The court relied on the rules enumerated in
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911), which sustain a legislative
classification "if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it."
Id. at 79. The court found in the statute's "declaration of policy," Mxc. STAT. ANN.
§ 17.502 (1968), a legislative intent to alleviate the economic insecurity caused by
involuntary unemployment and to encourage employers "to provide stable employ-
ment," and found a "rational and justifiable relation" between that intent and the
statute's distinction between employee-initiated and employer-initiated unemployment.
The facts in Holland illustrate the artificiality of the strike-lockout distinction. The
employers, motor carriers, were engaged in union contract negotiations in both
Michigan and Illinois. Employees were represented by Teamsters in both states, al-
though other unions were involved in Illinois. After negotiations broke down in
Michigan, the union commenced selective strikes there; employers responded with de-
fensive lockouts. When an agreement was reached, the Michigan employees returned
to work. When the Illinois workers later commenced selective strikes, and were de-
fensively locked out, the ensuing reduction in work involving transportation of goods
between Illinois and Michigan forced the employers to lay off some workers in Michi-
gan. It was this second period of unemployment for which the Michigan strikers
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In Dow Chemical Co. v. Taylor3 4 the exception to the striker dis-
qualification for employees laid off from interim employment 35 was
challenged. An employer argued that the payment of unemployment
compensation to striking workers who had obtained, and then been
laid off from, temporary work during the strike, interfered with the
employer's "federally protected right to bargain collectively."2 6  The
court recognized that paying unemployment compensation to strikers
under these circumstances could result in a frustration of federal policy,
denied defendant's motion to dismiss, and directed that discovery pro-
ceed and the case be prepared for trial.237
Although the Rhode Island cases238 have cast doubt on the possi-
bility of judicial application of the preemption doctrine where state
law permits subsidization of strikers through the unemployment com-
pensation system, the Michigan cases offer some hope that courts will
expose themselves to the increasing volume of relevant empirical evi-
dence and will come to recognize the economic impact of strike subsidies
on labor-management relations. With this understanding, courts may
begin to prohibit a state activity which substantially alters the balance
of power Congress intended to preserve with the NRLA.
I. FOOD STAMPS
The most recent chapter in the story of public subsidies for strikers
began with the Food Stamp Act of 1964.239 The concept underlying
were awarded unemployment benefits on the ground that they were locked out. 42
Mich. App. at 22-23, 201 N.W.2d at 309-10. Yet, their layoff was directly caused
by the strikes called by representatives of their union in Illinois. To describe the
Michigan workers as "involuntarily" unemployed is to ignore the pattern of events
responsible for the employers' immediate decision to lay them off.
234. 57 F.R.D. 105 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
235, See notes 179-82 supra and accompanying text.
236. 57 F.R.D. at 107.
237. Id. at 108:
[Tlhis court views the issue of supremacy as a mixed question of law and
fact. This court does not believe . . . that congressional inaction or failure
to pass particular amendments to unemployment tax laws results in a defini-
tive statement of congressional intent. Moreover, whether in fact the pay-
ment of unemployment compensation infringes an employer's collective bar-
gaining right cannot be decided by this court on the pleadings submitted.
238. Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, 475 F.2d 449 (1st Cir. 1973), rev'g 344 F. Supp.
749 (D.R.I. 1972); Almac's, Inc. v. Hackett, 312 F. Supp. 964 (D.R.I. 1970); ITT v.
Carter, Civil No. 3770 (D.R.I., April 6, 1967).
239. Act of Aug. 31, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-525, 78 Stat. 703, as amended, 7
U.S.C. §§ 2011-26 (1970, Supp. 11, 1972).
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the Act was not a new one; from 1939 to 1943 a food stamp program
had been conducted under the auspices of the Agriculture Department.
Ominously, the program was terminated because of the corruption and
inefficiency which characterized its administration. 24 0  The concept
was revived in 1954 when Congresswoman Sullivan of Missouri made
the first of many attempts to get a food stamp bill through Con-
gress. 24 :1 In 1959 she persuaded Congress to authorize a pilot food
stamp program which would operate only in certain counties and mu-
nicipalities. The Eisenhower Administration refused, however, to im-
plement the program, and it was not until the commencement of
the Kennedy Administration that the program got under way.242 By
1964 the pilot program proved to be a social and administrative suc-
cess in those areas in which it operated. Nevertheless, Sullivan's pro-
posal to make the program nationwide met with strong opposition from
the conservative coalition which dominated Congress. Passage of the
expanded program in 1964 was the result of a "deal," pursuant to which
certain southern Democrats voted for the food stamp program and cer-
tain northern liberals voted for a program of cotton and wheat subsi-
dies.2 43 There is no clear evidence that either the supporters or op-
ponents of the Act contemplated the possibility that the food stamp
program would be used as a means of subsidizing strikers. 24 4  It was
certainly not intended for that purpose. Nevertheless, nothing in the
loose language of the Act disqualified strikers.243
240. See 110 CoNG. R c. 7126 (1964) (remarks of Cong. Brown).
241. H.R. 7870, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); see 100 CONG. Rnc. 1692 (1954).
242. See 110 CONG. REc. 7131-32 (1964) (remarks of Cong. Sullivan).
243. Id. at 7140-41 (remarks of Cong. Saylor); id. at 7125 (remarks of Cong.
Brown); see H.R. RP. No. 189, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 18-19 (1967). This combina-
tion of disparate interests responsible for the farm subsidy-food support "deal" typifies
the cooperation between minority groups in a pluralistic democracy. See generally
R. DIm, THE IDEA or DEMOCACcy (1954). Usually, this cooperation occurs at the
expense of the majority and serves not the general good but rather the special interests
of the respective minorities.
244. See 116 CONG. REc. 42,015 (1970) (remarks of Cong. Abbit): "As a member
of the [Agriculture] committee in 1964, when this program started, I for one had no
idea that food stamps were to be used to subsidize strikers." Although Congressman
Poage indicated in 1967 that the Agriculture Committee had considered the strike
subsidy problem in 1964, 113 CONG. REc. 12,637 (1967) (remarks of Cong. Poage),
I have not located any contemporary evidence that either the Agriculture Committee or
Congress as a whole discussed the possibility of using food stamps to subsidize strikers.
245. Food Stamp Act of 1964 § 5(b), 7 U.S.C. § 2014(b) (1970), requires only
that the Secretary of HEW "establish uniform national standards of eligibility for
participation by households in the food stamp program" which must be met by par-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss3/1
Vol. 1973:469] A STUDY OF SUBSIDIES FOR STRIKERS
The Food Stamp Act authorized, in counties which elected to partic-
ipate in the program, the sale of food stamps-essentially a special
kind of scrip-at less than face value to needy households. The Act
left to the states the task of establishing standards for determining house-
hold eligibility, the number of stamps permitted per household, and the
rate at which the stamps could be purchased. 46 Purchasers of stamps
could exchange them for American food goods247 at participating stores
which, in turn, would be reimbursed from the United States Treasury.
The Act contemplated that the food stamp program would be small,
costing only $75 million, to be supplied from general funds. 248 The
Act provided that costs of administering the program be borne by the
counties. 2
49
ticipating states and must prescribe household income and asset criteria. 7 U.S.C.
§ 2014(c) (1970), amending 7 U.S.C. § 2014 (1964), excludes from eligibility house-
holds which include an "able-bodied adult between the ages of eighteen and sixty-five"
who has "refused to accept employment or public work" under prescribed circum-
stances. An exception to this disqualification is made for "refusal to work at a plant
or site subject to a strike or lockout for the duration of such strike or lockout-" Id.
The status of able-bodied adults who are initially unemployed because of a strike or
lockout is not indicated, however.
Apparently, some congressmen warned in 1964 that the loose language of the Act
might prove to be a source of difficulty. See 116 CONG. REc. 42,022 (1970) (re-
marks of Cong. Crane); id. at 37,546 (remarks of Sen. Thurmond).
246. 7 U.S.C. § 2019 (1970, Supp. H, 1972); Letter from James E. Springfield,
Deputy Director, Food Stamp Division, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, to U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, May 24, 1969:
Under the Food Stamp Act, the State welfare agency is responsible for the
certification of applicant food stamp families, using eligibility standards
which have been proposed by the State welfare agency and approved by the
Department of Agriculture. These standards include maximum net income
limitations consistent with the income standards used by the State welfare
agency in the administration of its Federally-aided public assistance programs.
These standards also place a limitation on the resources to be allowed eligible
households. Families in which all members are receiving some form of wel-
fare assistance are eligible to participate. Other low-income families may
also be eligible if their income and resources do not exceed the established
levels.
247. 7 U.S.C. § 2012(b) (1970) carefully restricts the use of stamps to "food or
food product for human consumption except alcoholic beverages, tobacco, those foods
which are identified on the package as being imported, and meat and meat products
which are imported."
248. Id. § 2025(a) (1970).
249. Responsibility for paying some of the costs of administering the program has
led a number of counties to decline to participate. The Agriculture Department's re-
fusal to implement the program in 109 such counties in Texas was challenged unsuc-
cessfully in Jay v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 441 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1971),
rev'g 308 F. Supp. 100 (N.D. Tex. 1969). Accord, Tucker v. Hardin, 430 F.2d 737
(1st Cir. 1970). The only states which have no counties participating in the food stamp
513
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The food stamp program grew rapidly, partly because the eligibility
standards were more liberal than those for public assistance. 210 Soon,
however, the deficiencies of the Act in terms of draftsmanship and
concept became evident. Its failure to define the term "household"
and its failure to impose some kind of work requirement enabled
classes of recipients not contemplated by Congress to take advantage
of benefits intended for the poor. And in the fall of 1965, lumberers
in the Northwest became the first group of strikers to find in the Act
a source of public subsidy.251
Misuse of the food stamp program was late in coming to the atten-
tion of Congress. But the discussion, debate, and compromise which
followed congressional recognition of the problem illustrate the diffi-
culty the political process has in correcting unintended use of social
legislation. Although there may have been some prior mention of the
possible use of food stamps as a strike subsidy,25 2 it was not until the
publicity attending the use of food stamps in the 1967 Ford strike251 and
the Montana copper strike later the same year254 that the conservative
opposition in the House attempted to block funding of the program by
focusing on strikers' use of food stamps. At the same time, the House
hearings 55 on extension of the Food Stamp Act disclosed major deficien-
cies in the administration of the program. Among these were inadequate
program are Arizona, Delaware, Massachusetts, Nevada, and New Hampshire. See
Hearings on H.R. 15896 et al. Before the House Agriculture Comm., 90th Cong., 2d
Sess., ser. ZZ, at 23-24 (1968) (Table III: Food Stamp Program).
250. See Hearings on HR. 1268, H.R. 1269, HR. 1318, H.R. 1317, & H.R. 7105
Before the House Agriculture Comm., 90th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. D, at 15-25 (1967).
251. For discussion of the early use of food stamps, see 117 CoNe. Ric. 21,672-73
(1971) (remarks of Cong. Michel).
252. See note 244 supra.
253. 114 CoNG. REc. 24,232 (1968) (remarks of Cong. Michel), citing the Wall
Street Iournal, quoted the president of one UAW local as estimating that as many as
seventy-five percent of its 4,700 members would make use of food stamps before the
strike ended.
254. N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1968, at 25, col. 5, quoted in 114 CoNe. Ruc. 24,232
(1968). The article indicated that the provision of food stamps was an important
factor in the prolongation of the strike, and noted that over 500 miners in Anaconda,
Montana, were receiving both food stamps and $100 per month in welfare benefits.
255. Hearings, supra note 249. One of the most peculiar features of these hearings
was the sparcity of protest by employers' groups against the use of food stamps to
subsidize strikers. The Greater Detroit Board of Commerce did write a letter to the
committee pointing out that during the 1967 Ford strike 3,809 strikers' families in
Detroit received $273,171 worth of food stamps at a cost of $157,420, for a net sub-
sidy of $115,751. Id. at 130-31.
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procedures for screening applicants with regard to income eligibility
and inadequate identification of participants. 251
The hearings prompted Congresswoman May of Washington to in-
troduce a bill which authorized a continuation of the food stamp pro-
gram but disqualified "any person who is engaged in a strike, labor
dispute, or voluntary work stoppage, '257 and "any person who is a
student attending an institution of higher learning.' '258  The Senate
Agriculture Committee adopted the May bill rather than the
Sullivan bill, which merely extended the program another four years
with an open-ended appropriation. House proponents of the Sullivan
bill argued that all workers idled by strikes were not in favor of the
strikes,259 that disqualification of strikers would work an economic
hardship on persons involved in a lawful activity,2"' and that the value
of stamps provided for strikers represented only a small percentage
of the total cost of the program.20' Proponents of the May bill ar-
gued that the provision of food stamps to strikers was costly,262 and
that the limited resources available for the program should be used
to help those whose need arose from circumstances beyond their con-
trol.2 5  The House passed a compromise bill which disqualified strik-
ers and students, but provided for an open-ended appropriation.264
The Senate, meanwhile, passed an open-ended appropriation with-
out a striker disqualification, and the matter went to a joint conference
committee.2 65  In committee, liberals made abandonment of the dis-
qualification the price for their continued support of the farm subsidy
program. The Senate conferees, many of whom represented large
farming interests, succeeded in removing the striker disqualification
from the conference bill. 2 0 Conservative House conferees refused to
256. In one highly publicized case, a resident of Philadelphia acted as a proxy on
behalf of 969 individuals to buy $53,128 worth of food stamps for $36,892. 114
CONo. REc. 11,278-79 (1968) (remarks of Cong. Sullivan). See also id. at 15,869-70
(remarks of Cong. Martin) (use of food stamps by college students).
257. H.R. 18,249, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
258. Id.
259. See 114 CONG. Rrc. 24,233 (1968) (remarks of Cong. Sullivan).
260. Id. at 24,227-28 (remarks of Cong. Olsen).
261. See Hearings, supra note 249, at 34-35.
262. See 114 CONG. Rnc. 24,232-33 (1968) (remarks of Cong. Michel).
263. Id. at 23,946 (remarks of Cong. May).
264. Id. at 24,244.
265. See id. at 24,687, 26,196.
266. Id. at 28,314.
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sign the conference report, and led a fight on the House floor to send
the House conferees back to committee with binding instructions to
secure Senate concurrence in retaining the striker disqualification."'
The proposal to send the bill back to conference was defeated, 0 8 and
the conference bill was enacted. 00
In 1970 the food stamp program was significantly amended, but
provision of food stamps to strikers was not eliminated. In September
1969 the Senate passed a bill2 70 which modified the program by pro-
viding free food stamps and eliminating the requirement that a house-
hold purchase all the food stamps allotted to it. Meanwhile, a Nixon
Administration proposal 7l introduced in the House authorized the dis-
tribution of free food stamps and partial use of a household food stamp
allotment, and contained a work requirement similar to that contained
in the proposed Family Assistance Plan.27 2  After extensive hear-
ings273 marked by concern for the skyrocketing costs of the food stamp
program, the House Agriculture Committee reported a clean bill to
the House which included a prohibition against free food stamps, a
requirement that the states eventually assume ten percent of the cost
of the program, and a work requirement which disqualified any house-
hold containing an able-bodied adult (except mothers of children un-
der eighteen, students, or persons caring for children or incapacitated
adults) who refused to register for work or to accept a job salaried
at the higher of the applicable state or federal minimum wage. 74  The
bill survived attempts to add a striker disqualification, 27 i a self-certifi-
267. Id. at 28,001-08.
268. Id. at 28,009.
269. Id. at 31,310 (passage of S. 3068, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968)).
270. S. 2014, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1969). See also Hearings on S. 2014 Before
the Senate Comm. on Agriculture & Forestry, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1969).
271. H.R. 12,222, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1969).
272. H.R. 1, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
273. Hearings Before the House Agriculture Comm., 90th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. Q,
pts. 1 & 2 (1969). Discussion of the striker subsidization issue is found in id. pt. 2, at
794-98, 808. Again, no representative of business appeared to oppose subsidization.
The Secretary of Agriculture estimated that the food stamp program would cost $1.5
billion in fiscal 1971. Id. pt. 1, at 17. See H.R. RaP. No. 1402, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1970).
274. H.R. 18,582, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). The work requirement was severely
criticized in a minority report, H.R. REP. No. 1402, supra note 273, at 6042-47.
275. H.R. RaP. No. 1402, supra note 273, at 6049-50. The disqualification was
omitted on the ground that the Committee "does not wish to take sides in labor disputes
and does not believe this bill is the proper place to solve labor-management problems."
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cation provision,27 6 and authorization for free stamps,2 77 and was
passed by the House in December 1970.78 Again, a joint conference
committee produced compromise legislation. The amendments
dropped the House provision that the states share the costs of the pro-
gram, permitted families with an income of less than thirty dollars per
month to receive free stamps, authorized self-certification for welfare
recipients only, and retained the House work requirement.27
Again in 1971 and 1973 efforts to disqualify strikers from food
stamp eligibility were defeated. A proposed amendment to a 1971
Id. at 6035. Objections to the use of food stamps by strikers paralleled the tradi-
tional rationales for the labor dispute disqualification in unemployment compensation,
see notes 151-53 supra and accompanying text. The objections here were that sub-
sidization violates governmental neutrality in labor disputes, prolongs strikes, and forces
taxpayers to subsidize other taxpayers who are "by choice, unemployed." 116 CoNG.
REc. 36,603-04 (1970) (remarks of Cong. Goodling); see id. at 34,865-67 (remarks of
Cong. Ashbrook); 114 CONG. Ric. 28,003 (1968) (remarks of Cong. Teague).
276. H.R. 19,889, § 5(c), 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). Backers of this provision
ignored the possibility that self-certification would lead to widespread fraud. That the
program was already subject to considerable abuse was revealed by a study showing
that in Washington in 1970 some $600,000 worth of stamps were wrongfully dis-
tributed, the irregularities involved thirty percent of all participants in the state's food
stamp program. Floyd, Food Stamp Pirates Take Their Cut, 49 ToDAY'S HEALTH 23
(1971), cited in 117 CONG. REc. H 210-11 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1971). See also United
States v. Wilson, 438 F.2d 479 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 929 (1971). The
bill's work requirement penalized only the individual for failure to register for or ac-
cept work and thus left open the possibility that disqualified individuals could take
food from their children.
277. H.R. 19,889, supra note 276, at § 6(b), provided free stamps for households
with income not exceeding the equivalent of $30 per month for four persons.
278. 116 CONG. REC. 42,035 (1970). Publicity concerning the provision of food
stamps to General Motors strikers in the fall of 1970 increased House floor support
for a striker disqualification amendment. See, e.g., id. at 36,603-04 (remarks of Cong.
Goodling); id. at 34,865-67 (remarks of Cong. Ashbrook). Another new bill to dis-
qualify strikers was introduced on November 17, 1970. S. 4505, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970). Support for the amendment was further increased by recognition that
strikers' eligibility was partly responsible for the tremendous increases in the cost of
the food stamp program. For example, the cost rose from $102 million in August
1970 to $116 million in September, $123 million in October, and $127 million in
November-the period corresponding to the General Motors strike. 116 CoNG. REc.
S 19,764 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 1970) (remarks of Sen. McGovern). An estimated $12
million to $14 million was expended for stamps to Detroit strikers alone. 116 CoNG.
REc. 42.022 (1970) (remarks of Cong. Poage). Nonetheless, the striker disqualifica-
tion was defeated by a recorded vote of 183 to 172; the vote was misleadingly close
due to the absence of a number of House liberals who opposed the amendment.
See id. at 42,032-33.
279. Act of Jan. 11, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-671, 84 Stat. 2048, amending 7 U.S.C.
§§ 2011-25 (1964) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-26 (1970, Supp. II, 1972)).
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agriculture appropriations bill °0 which would have prohibited distribu-
tion of food stamps to strikers' families was defeated by the House.281
In 1973 another striker disqualification was passed by the House;
282
after a conference committee was unable to resolve the striker issue,2 88
a new bill to disqualify strikers was defeated on the floor of the Sen-
ate284 by the same farm-labor alliance which had earlier made provi-
sion of food stamps to strikers the price of the farm subsidy pro-
gram.28 5  After parliamentary maneuvers in the House prevented a
second vote on the disqualification amendment, 2 0 the House, forced
to choose between an agriculture bill without the amendment and no
bill at all, passed the bill without amendment. Again, a combina-
tion of special interest groups preserved subsidies for both farmers and
striking laborers.
Thus Congress has resisted efforts to disqualify strikers' households
from receiving food stamps. The Agriculture Department recently is-
sued a regulation which specifically renders a worker's participation
in either a strike or lockout irrelevant in determining eligibility. 28 7 The
work requirement2s may eliminate some strikers from eligibility, but
280. H.R. 9270, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
281. 117 CoNG. R c. 21,676-77 (1971) (by a vote of 225 to 172). Proponents of
the amendment again argued that subsidizing strikers' families prolongs strikes, id.
at 21,674 (remarks of Cong. Goodling), and violates governmental neutrality in labor-
management relations, id. at 21,672-73 (remarks of Cong. Michel). Opponents again
argued that it is unfair to punish strikers who voted against calling a strike, id.
at 21,674 (remarks of Cong. Foley); id. at 21,673 (remarks of Cong. Hungate), or
the families of strikers, id. at 21,675 (remarks of Cong. Conyers); id. at 61,673
(remarks of Cong. Burton).
282. 119 CONG. REc. H 6352-53 (daily ed. July 19, 1973) (by a vote of 208 to
207). The House had voted favorably on a preliminary version of the amendment by
a vote of 213 to 203. Id. at H 6334.
283. See id. at S 15,213 (daily ed. July 31, 1973).
284. Id. at S 15,238 (by a vote of 58 to 34).
285. Id. at S 15,237 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey): "There are honest differences
of opinion about this amendment. I simply say to my colleagues, if you want a farm
bill, you must vote down this amendment.. ....
286. Id. at H 7437 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1973) (remarks of Cong. Steiger).
287. 7 C.F.R. § 271.3(e) (4) (1973): "No household shall be denied participation
in the program solely on the grounds that a member of the household is not working
because of a strike or lockout at his usual place of employment."
288. 7 U.S.C. § 2014(c) (1970). 7 C.F.R. § 271.3(e) (1973) expressly brings
"a person who is not working because of a strike or lockout at his usual place of
employment" within the work requirement. The work registration requirement is
waived for able-bodied adults working at least thirty hours per week; a proposed regu-
lation requiring only thirty hours of employment per week, 36 Fed. Reg. 7246 (1971),
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss3/1
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will probably have only minimal impact for the same reasons that the
work requirement in the welfare program has little impact: lack of
available jobs, unwillingness of employers to hire temporary employ-
ees, and poor administration.2 9  Also, in determining whether avail-
able work is "suitable," the Department must consider whether it is
in the "major field of experience" of the applicant, 290 and must regard
as unsuitable work offered at "a site subject to a strike or lockout
at the time of the offer,"291 or work which requires the applicant to
join or resign from "any legitimate labor organization." 29  The food
stamp program's financial eligibility criteria relating to income and as-
set level will not ordinarily disqualify strikers for the same reason that
similar welfare standards do not.293 Furthermore, an Agriculture De-
partment regulation exempts from the income and asset requirements
any household in which "all members are included in a federally aided
public assistance or general assistance grant. '2 94  Thus it seems likely
that the food stamp program, unless amended by Congress, will con-
tinue to be a source of government subsidy for strikers.2 93
In 1971 the battle over the provision of food stamps to strikers
was discarded to prevent striker avoidance of the registration requirement in light of
decisions rendering strikers "employed" under the NLRA, e.g., NLRB v. Fleetwood
Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967); NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26
(1967). See 36 Fed. Reg. 20,147 (1971).
289. The Act excludes, in effect, college students and hippies from participation
in the food stamp program by virtue of a provision limiting eligibility to households
composed of individuals related to each other. 7 U.S.C. § 2012(e) (Supp. I, 1972).
This section was held to create an unconstitutional classification in United States Dep't
of Agriculture v. Moreno, 93 S. Ct. 2821 (1973). Students are also generally excluded
by 7 U.S.C. § 2014(b) (Supp. II, 1972), which disqualifies households containing a per-
son over eighteen who is claimed as a dependent for income tax purposes by a non-
household member. This section was held unconstitutional in United States Dep't of
Agriculture v. Murry, 93 S. Ct. 2832 (1973).
290. 7 C.F.R. § 271.3(e)(5)(iii) (1973). This provision may effectively eliminate
the work requirement for strikers, since strikes may affect virtually all available work
of a certain kind within a community. Although work outside the "major field of
experience" must be accepted after "a reasonable period of time," id., the majority of
strikes are of relatively brief duration. The "major field of experience" exception is
probably contrary to the intent of Congress. See 116 CONG. Rnc. 44,168 (1970) (re-
marks of Cong. Annunzio); id. at 44,164-65 (remarks of Cong. Poage).
291. 7 C.F.R. § 271.3(e)(3)(iv) (1973).
292. Id. § 271.3(e) (3) (iii). The work also must be reasonably near the appli-
cant's residence. Id. § 271.3 (e) (5)(iv).
293. See notes 39-43 supra and accompanying text.
294. 7 C.F.R. § 271.3(b) (1973).
295. See note 437 infra.
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shifted from Congress to the courts. In Russo v. Kirby00 strikers
sought to force the New York Commissioner of Social Services to
permit them to purchase food stamps. Treating food stamps as a part
of the welfare program-even though the programs are governed by
completely different statutes and regulations-the district court ordered
the Commissioner to make retroactive payment of food stamps to strik-
ers whose applications had initially been accepted but later disqualified
for their participation in a strike.297  In a subsequent decision, the
court recognized that federal regulations forbid retroactive purchase
of food stamps, but re-fashioned its remedy to permit such purchase
by ordering future provision of food stamps to strikers wrongly
denied them by the Commissioner.08 This order violated both the
letter and the spirit of the Food Stamp Act by permitting households
to receive stamps after the expiration of their eligibility, and after they
had ceased to be low-income households which need such an adjust-
ment "to purchase a nutritionally adequate diet. '2 9  The validity of
the order was thrown into doubt by the Second Circuit's reversaP0 0
on the ground that the district court lacked jurisdiction.
IV. SUBSIDIES: TEE MISLEADING ARGUMENTS
The debate over governmental subsidization of strikers has its origins
in the Depression when initial proposals for unemployment compensa-
tion raised the question of striker eligibility.30 1 Although the debate
has continued for some forty years, its intellectual level, never high,
has not been raised significantly. Indeed, it is a debate which has
been characterized on both sides by strident emotionalism rather than
cool-headed contemplation. This, of course, is not surprising. An
examination of the costs of subsidies and a study of the impact of
subsidies on the collective bargaining process indicate how important
this issue is to the parties and, indirectly, to the country. Before ex-
amining the real implications of the debate on the provision of subsi-
dies, however, it is necessary to examine some common arguments
which have been raised in the course of the debate.
296. 78 L.R.R.M. 2533 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 453 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1971).
297. Id. at 2540.
298. 335 F. Supp. 122, 124 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
299. 7 U.S.C. § 2011 (1970).
300. 453 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1971). See notes 89-103 supra and accompanying
text.
301. See notes 137-50 supra and accompanying text.
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Perhaps the most common argument against the provision of subsi-
dies to strikers is that the legislative bodies which established these
subsidy programs did not intend that they be used to aid strikers. 302
This argument does not apply to the unemployment compensation pro-
gram since all state statutes include some striker disqualification provi-
sion." 3  If this argument originally had any validity with respect to
the food stamp program it has none presently in view of Congress'
repeated rejections of proposed striker disqualification amendments to
the Food Stamp Act.3 4 Even with respect to the welfare programs
there may be some question as to the current, if not the original, intent
of Congress and the state legislatures regarding the use of these pro-
grams as subsidies to strikers. It should be recognized, however, that
provision of subsidies under any of these programs to individuals whose
temporary need is self-induced in an effort to improve their economic
condition does not seem consistent with the basic rationale of the pro-
grams.3 1o5
A second common argument against the provision of subsidies
to strikers is that this use of subsidies may exhaust the resources avail-
able for the programs.30 6 This consideration was particularly influen-
tial in the development of the labor dispute disqualification in unem-
ployment compensation laws since the founders of unemployment com-
pensation feared that the provision of benefits to strikers would place
too heavy a burden on the unemployment fund.107  The significance
of this consideration in the food stamp area is evidenced by the fact
that providing stamps to strikers was partly responsible for the need
for emergency supplemental appropriations in 1970.308 The usual an-
302. See Williams, The Labor Dispute Disqualification-A Primer and Some Prob-
letup, 8 VAND. L. REv. 338, 354 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Williams].
303. See notes 148-54 supra and accompanying text.
304. See notes 252-86 supra and accompanying text.
305. Some commentators have argued that the voluntary-involuntary rationale is not
the theme of the unemployment compensation statute. See Bullitt, Unemployment
Compensation in Labor Disputes, 25 WASH. L. REv. 50, 54 (1950); Fierst & Spector,
Unemployment Compensation in Labor Disputes, 49 YALE L.J. 461, 464 (1940);
Lesser, supra note 166, at 171; Shadur, supra note 147, at 296 n.8; Note, Eligibility
for Unemployment Benefits of Persons Involuntarily Unemployed Because of Labor
Disputes, 49 COLUm. L. REv. 550 (1949), cited in Williams 354 n.68. Obviously,
there are exceptions to this concept in the statutes but the weakness of these commenta-
tors' claim is clear if one adopts their implicit position that the purpose of unemployment
compensation is to benefit the voluntarily unemployed.
306. See Williams 354.
307. See Pribram, supra note 153.
308. See 116 CONG. REc. 38,902 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Brooke).
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swer to this argument is simple: If the provision of benefits to strikers
exceeds the resources allocable to these programs or depletes the re-
serves of the unemployment fund, the resources can be increased and
employers can be required to pay more into the fund. 09 As a practical
matter the answer is not so easy, for there is obviously a limit beyond
which the public cannot, or will not, support the idle. When this limit
is reached, food provided the voluntarily unemployed is literally taken
from the mouths of the genuinely poor. 1 °0
A third argument against the provision of subsidies to strikers is
that it violates a tradition of governmental neutrality in labor dis-
putes.8 11 Some observers have argued sophistically, however, that to
deny benefits to otherwise qualified individuals because of their par-
ticipation in a labor dispute would be equally "unneutral." 312  Al-
though the claim that inaction, as well as action, affects the fortunes
of the combatants has a certain philosophical merit, it tends to obscure
the fact that provision, rather than denial, of subsidies to strikers rep-
resents a change in the status quo and thus, from an historical stand-
point, constitutes a governmental intervention. 18 And even if it is im-
possible for the government to remain "neutral," the appearance of
governmental neutrality may, in a democracy, be as significant as its
reality, since the conviction that the government "unfairly" sides with
one's adversaries undermines support for the government.81 4  It should
309. See Lesser, supra note 166, at 176-77.
310. A number of states do not pay welfare benefits in amounts sufficient to meet
one hundred percent of a family's need. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,
473 (1970); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 408-09 (1970); Welfare for Strikers
95-96. Possibly, striker disqualification in these states would enable the genuinely
poor to receive welfare benefits commensurate with their need.
311. See Brobston v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 94 Ariz. 371, 385 P.2d 239
(1963); In re Steelman, 219 N.C. 306, 13 S.E.2d 544 (1941); Haggart, Unemploy-
ment Compensation During Labor Disputes, 37 NEB. L. Rav. 668, 688-89 (1958); Wil-
liams 354.
312. E.g., C. SuMMEPS & H. WELLINGTON, supra note 1, at 817.
313. Williams 356-57:
[We have tended to view government's role in the collective bargaining
process as being no more than establishing a relative equality of bargaining
power. Then the rest is left to the parties. Any attempt to establish a plan
whereby government paid or withheld compensation benefits upon a determi-
nation as to which side ought to succeed in the labor dispute would certainly
establish the government in an active role concerning what are fair and just
working conditions. The unemployment compensation law does not seem to
be the place where such a major shift in governmental policy should take
place.
314. Id. at 357-58.
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be noted that it is questionable whether the federal government has
ever consistently practiced neutrality in labor-management relations.31.
A final argument against the provision of subsidies to strikers is
the moral argument: It is unfair to take money from the public at
large to subsidize any group. One problem with this argument is,
of course, that it can be used against the entire welfare program.
Even if one qualifies the argument by restricting it to groups which
do not "deserve" such assistance, one still is faced with the fact that
the government provides a series of unnecessary subsidies to farmers,316
shipowners,31 7 homeowners, s and other groups. Nevertheless, the in-
creasing protest against such subsidization suggests a growing aware-
ness in principle that governmental subsidization is wrong.
It seems, then, that the common arguments against the provision
of public subsidies to strikers are not overwhelmingly persuasive. The
legislative intent argument does not have much basis in fact; in any
315. For example, antitrust laws may prohibit certain union activities. Ramsey v.
United Mine Workers, 401 U.S. 302 (1971) (conspiracy of union and major coal pro-
ducers to impose collective bargaining agreement on all producers); Allen Brad-
ley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945) (combination of union, con-
tractors, and manufacturers). Strikes and lockouts which "will imperil the na-
tional health or safety" may be enjoined. LU1RA §§ 206-10, 29 U.S.C. §§ 176-80
(1970). See United Steelworkers v. United States, 361 U.S. 39 (1959). An individual
may not hold a position in federal government if he "participates in a strike, or
asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States . . . ." 5
U.S.C. § 7311(3) (1970). Minor disputes arising from collective bargaining agree-
ments in the railroad industry are subject to mandatory arbitration, Railway Labor
Act § 3, 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1970), and strikes by railway workers may be enjoined
despite the prohibition of the Norris-LaGuardia Act § 4, 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970), against
anti-strike injunctions. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I.R.R., 353 U.S.
30 (1957). And it is an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization to
"discriminate against any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin," Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1970, Supp. If,
1972); unions may be enjoined from striking in an effort to interfere with a plan
whose purpose is to correct the effects of racial discrimination. United States v.
Carpenters Local 169, 457 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1972). For an example of a govern-
ment attempt to prescribe the terms of labor-management relations, see Sam Andrews'
Sons v. Mitchell, 457 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1972), in which the court struck down as
exceeding the authority of the Attorney General a regulation issued under the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (1970), prohibiting migrant
workers from working on any farm which is the situs of a labor dispute.
316. E.g., 7 U.S.C. § 347(a) (1970) (assistance for disadvantaged agricultural
areas); 12 U.S.C. §§ 2001-259 (Supp. II, 1972) (farm credit system).
317. E.g., 46 U.S.C. § 1152(b) (1970) (subsidy for shipbuilders).
318. E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (1970, Supp. II, 1972) (mortgage assistance for
low-income families).Washington University Open Scholarship
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event it does not answer the basio question whether such subsidies
should be provided. The financial limitation problem, the principle
of governmental neutrality in labor disputes, and the anti-governmental
subsidy principle suggest matters which should be considered in decid-
ing, but do not resolve, whether subsidies should be paid, although
these arguments place on proponents of subsidies the burden of mak-
ing a convincing case that the provision of subsidies to strikers is in the
public interest.
This the proponents of aid to strikers have failed to do. One
common argument in favor of aid to strikers is that the strikers meet
the technical eligibility requirements of the various programs and are
consequently eligible for subsidies."" This argument may be true ei-
ther as a matter of fact or law, but again does not answer the basic
question whether subsidies should be provided to strikers. A more
sophisticated version of this argument emphasizes that the purpose
of the programs is to provide aid to the needy and since the
strikers are needy, they are therefore rightful recipients of subsidies.20
This contention ignores the distinction between those whose need is
not the result of their own doing and those whose need is self-induced,
and does not deal with the basic question of the desirability of aiding
strikers, except to the extent that it suggests a basic governmental prin-
ciple of helping those in need.
A second common argument in favor of subsidies to strikers is that
the strikers are entitled to subsidies because they are taxpayers. 321
Nothing in the Constitution gives citizens, whether taxpayers or not,
the right to receive governmental subsidies. Also, the logic of the ar-
gument is weakened by the fact that aid eligibility is determined with-
out regard to whether the applicant is, or has been, a taxpayer. Fin-
ally, the argument carried to its logical end would seem to make eligi-
bility for all governmental programs dependent upon the applicant's
status as a taxpayer, which obscures the more important policy con-
siderations behind the selection of particular groups for participation.
319. See Andrus, Welfare Payment to Strikers, in COLLEcnVE BA R&AININO: SuR-
vrVAL IN THE '70's?, at 356 (R. Rowan ed. 1972).
320. See Schindler, Collective Bargaining and Unemployment Insurance Legisla-
tion, 38 COLUm. L. Rlv. 858 (1938).
321. E.g., U.S. Nnws & WoLD RAP., Nov. 23, 1970, at 18 (comment of a General
Motors striker): "'I pay my taxes too. I'm entitled to something for my money.
I don't go out and steal. I don't look for something for nothing. I want to go back
to work.'"https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss3/1
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A third common argument in favor of aid to strikers is the so-called
"hardship" argument. Adherents to this argument agree, at least for
the purpose of discussion, that strikers themselves should assume the
risks of need while pursuing their economic advantage. They claim,
however, that it is unfair to penalize families for the actions of the
parents.22- It is hardly possible, however, to separate a breadwinner
from his family. Both will share in the benefits of a strike; accord-
ingly, it would seem that both should share in the hardships. More-
over, inherent in the assumption of free collective bargaining is the
idea that both sides suffer in a strike and that such suffering forces
them to compromise. If a worker runs out of funds to support his
family, he lowers his demands and reaches a compromise with his em-
ployer. Of course, before this compromise is reached, he and his
family may suffer some hardship. But if the primary goal in collective
bargaining is to prevent the striker and his family from suffering any
hardship, it would be better accomplished not by providing subsidies
to strikers but by outlawing strikes.3"3 Another version of the hardship
argument is that disqualification of all strikers is unfair to the workers
who opposed the strike.2 It must be recognized, however, that both
proponents and opponents of the strike will benefit equally from the
strike if it is successful; consequently, it would seem only fair that
they should suffer equally the hardships of the strike. Moreover,
if the real goal is to protect the minority opposing the strike, it is
accomplished more directly by guaranteeing its right to continue work-
ing during a strike than by providing subsidies to all strikers
because a minority is forced to stop work against its will.3 25
A fourth argument for subsidizing strikers is that failure to provide
subsidies destroys the right to strike. It should be noted that this ar-
gument apparently contradicts the hardship argument by assuming that
when most strikers find the hardships too burdensome they will termi-
nate the strike rather than continue to suffer. In a descriptive sense
this argument is completely false, since denial of subsidies does not
abrogate the right to strike, although it makes the exercise of the right
more costly. Historically, the argument is without basis. Although
322. See 114 CoNG. REc. 24,586 (1968) (remarks of Cong. Saylor).
323. See TInEBLOT & CowrN 204-05.
324. See 114 CoNG. REc. 24,586 (1968) (remarks of Cong. Saylor).
325. Labor leaders do not favor this concept. See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg.
Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
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the right to strike has existed under national law since 1935,820 exten-
sive provision of subsidies to strikers is a relatively new development.
Finally, from a logical standpoint the argument is simply absurd. Re-
fusal to compensate an activity does not necessarily destroy it,827 al-
though removal of existing compensation can make the activity less
attractive and thus affect future planning.
A fifth argument in favor of subsidizing strikers is that businesses
which are being struck receive certain governmental "subsidies," in-
cluding government contracts, tax deductions, and other specialized
governmental "subsidies" such as the oil depletion allowance.828 To
the extent that these benefits may be considered governmental "subsi-
dies," however, they are analogous not to the striker's receipt of welfare
benefits but rather to his receipt of veterans' benefits, in the sense
that veterans' benefits are not provided because of the strike but with-
out regard to it. In this sense government contracts and tax benefits
are not true subsidies. Moreover, even if this argument were
descriptively accurate it does not demonstrate that provision of subsi-
dies to strikers is in the public interest.
A sixth argument in favor of subsidies is that the various state pro-
grams of welfare, unemployment compensation, and food stamps can
be administered more easily and consistently without striker disqualifi-
cations.82 9  Of course, administration would be eased if all financial
criteria or residence requirements were eliminated. Further, an exam-
ination of the cost of providing benefits to strikers compared with the
cost of disqualifying them indicates the absurdity of the administrative
convenience argument.
A final argument for the provision of subsidies to strikers is that
it contributes to the peaceful settlement of economic disputes and dis-
courages violation of the law by strikers.8 3  Far from compelling sub-
sidization of strikers, this argument constitutes a ground for refusing
aid, for experience has demonstrated the folly of acceding to the
326. NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). See note 91 supra.
327. See 114 CONG. REc. 28,005 (1968) (remarks of Cong. Belcher). When I
exercise my right to write law review articles at the expense of engaging in gainful
employment, I am not entitled to government subsidy on the theory that denying such
benefits would "strangle an otherwise lawful activity," or "forfeit" my rights. Strat-O-
Seal Mfg. Co. v. Scott, 72 Ill. App. 2d 480, 485, 218 N.E.2d 227, 230 (1966).
328. See THIBBLOT & COwiN 205-06.
329. See Fierst & Spector, supra note 305, at 489.
330. See THMBLOT & CowiN 206-07.
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threat of violence. On a descriptive level the argument is not valid
because a number of strikes in which strikers received significant gov-
ernmental subsidies were marked by violence.331
Accordingly, it seems that the proponents of aid have also failed
to show any compelling reason to extend such aid to strikers. Ironi-
cally, however, both proponents and opponents of aiding strikers have
generally failed to consider the major disadvantage of such subsidies-
the ultimate cost to the public. It is most difficult to determine the
cost of public subsidies to strikers because of the failure of government
officials to maintain statistics showing striker participation in the vari-
ous subsidy programs.332 But it has been estimated that in 1973 strik-
ers will receive approximately $238,826,000 in food stamps, $62,640,-
000 in AFDC-U, and $2,412,000 in general assistance.33 3  Although
it is impossible to estimate the costs of unemployment insurance be-
cause by and large it plays a significant part in strikes only in New
York and Rhode Island and in railroad strikes, it should be noted
that the New York telephone strike alone cost approximately $41 mil-
lion." ' In addition, provision of benefits to strikers will increase the
administrative costs of operating welfare programs in 1973 by approxi-
mately $2,350,000.-:1 Finally, striker eligibility for aid in the School
Lunch Programs and Medicaid will probably cost an additional
$24,650,000 in 1973.336 Thus the total direct cost to taxpayers of
providing public subsidies to strikers in 1973 could amount to some
$330 million.33- And the indirect costs of subsidies are far greater
than the direct costs.
V. LABOR EcoNomVcs AND SUBSIDIES
FOR STRIKERS
The impact of striker subsidies on labor policy is illustrated by an
examination of the collective bargaining process. As contract negoti-
ations commence between any employer and union, each seeks to maxi-
mize the financial return for the interests it represents by manipulation
331. See note 224 supra.
332. See Welfare for Strikers 101 n.133.
333. THiBLOT & COWIN 190-96.
334. N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1972, at 34, col. 2.
335. THEBLOT & COWIN 195.
336. Id. at 196.
337. Id. The cost of government subsidies could increase dramatically if unions
cease payment of strike benefits. See Welfare for Strikers 103-04.
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of the wage rate.338 Certain limitations, however, are imposed upon









drops from Xa--the maximum rate which he can pay and still make a
profit-the labor supply drops correspondingly. When he forces the
wage below X 2, he loses some of his employees to more attractive
employers. When he lowers the wage to X 1, he loses all of his em-
ployees.8 39  Therefore, the lowest wage rate which the employer can
338. Wage rate must be understood to include not just the employee's regular hourly
rate but total hourly employment costs. Implicit in this discussion is the assumption
that all demands of either party have a cost which can be expressed in quantitative
terms, even though the calculation of such cost in actual practice may be quite difficult.
L. REYNOLDS, LABOR ECONOMICS AND LABOR RELATIONS 423-24 (5th ed. 1970) [here-
inafter cited as REYNOLDS]. It should be noted that a concession by one party which
costs it amount A may benefit the other party by amount B, which may be greater
or less than A. When the demands of either party are "principled" demands designed
to destroy or seriously impair the ability of the other to function, this assumption is
not operable. Such demands are not economic proposals but guerilla tactics-a fact
which goes far to explain the unsuccessful attempt of the NLRB in H.K. Porter Co.
v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970), to order an employer to agree to a "substantive
contractual provision in a collective bargaining agreement," id. at 102, on a finding
that the employer was motivated solely by a "desire to frustrate agreement." Id. at
107. The court held that the NLRB had authority only to "referee the process of
collective bargaining, leaving the results of the contest to the bargaining strengths of
the parties." Id. at 108.
339. The location of X 1 depends on the general demand for labor. In a company
town it might be close to the survival wage-the wage adequate to maintain the mini-
mum standard of living. It might even go below that point in a company town where
the work force was exceedingly old and where employees who expected to receive a
pension if they could work for several more years would accept less than a survival
wage and live off their capital to avoid forfeiture of pension rights.
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the union cannot force the wage rate above X1 without forcing the
employer to dispense with some of his employees.a 4l It cannot raise
the wage rate above X2 without forcing the employer to close his opera-
tion. 4' The highest wage rate which the union can demand of the
employer lies in the zone X, to X2. 34 - Thus the upper and lower limits
340. The exact location within this zone would depend on the employer's marginal
cost calculation.
34 1. In some cases, this point would be determined by the employer's marginal cost
curve, which would necessitate the curtailment of marginal production when labor unit
costs reached a certain height. In other cases, this point would be determined by the
employer's ability to replace employees with machines (automation) when labor
costs reached a certain height.
342. The location of X2 depends on the amount of capital invested in the business
and the salability of that capital. It might be possible for X2 to be located so high
that the employer would lose money yearly on the operation of the business but would
continue operations because closure with a sale of capital assets at the market price
would result in a bigger loss.
343. The exact location would depend on the union's desire to maximize employ-
ment. On occasion, unions make a deliberate choice to maximize wages of employees
and minimize employment. For discussion of a studied attempt by the United Mine
Workers to do this, see M. BARATZ, TAE UNION AND THE COAL INDusTRY 51-74,
138-51 (1955). There is strong evidence that the United Steel Workers (USW)
made a similar choice in the context of the 1971 steel negotiations. See, e.g., Pitts-
burgh Forum, Aug. 6, 1971, at 18, which, reflecting the USW viewpoint, noted:
But the impact will be enormous. Over the next few years, the long term
reduction in the steel work force will move at a faster pace. Perhaps marginal
companies will fall by the wayside, perhaps others will merge, granting gov-
ernment permission. Obsolete mills will be closed down, including eventually
some sections of J&L's Pittsburgh Works. The union strategists knew all of
Washington University Open Scholarship
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of the wage rate are fixed not by collective bargaining, but by the opera-
tion of economic forces which are not within the direct control of the
immediate parties.3s
Although in theory both employer and employee desire a wage rate
as near the end of their respective limits as possible, and should at
least make initial offers approaching these limits, in practice the limits
are not obtainable. The reason for this is simple: In most cases nei-
ther employer nor employee has true freedom of contract. An em-
ployer of any size cannot replace any significant portion of his work
force; similarly, no large group of employees can expect to find other
employment if it leaves its employer. In other words, the parties have
no freedom not to contract; they must reach agreement with each
other.84  This realization forces each party, even in his initial pro-
posals, to restrict his demands not to the limits demonstrated by the
above graphs, but to limits well inside of the contract zone-to limits
determined by the expectations of both parties.8 4 Assuming, then,
that the parties' demands 47 fall well within the limits of the contract
zone, there will still be a considerable difference between their posi-
tions. The question then arises as to what causes the compromise to
this even as they bargained, but they also knew the virtual impossibility of
negotiating any less. You can persuade a few hundred workers to settle for
less-than-pattern, but not 400,000. It was important, they felt, to the struc-
ture of the industry, the economies of the steel communities, and the future
of the union that steel remain a high wage industry.
Of course, this raises the question whether union and industry are competent to make
decisions of this nature in view of their impact on the national employment picture.
344. These economic factors are, however, subject to political regulation. Without
the imposition of "voluntary" steel quotas on the Japanese and West European produc-
ers, the range X, to X2 in the steel industry would be considerably lower, since the
"natural" law of supply and demand would permit foreign steelmakers to sell more
steel in the United States. The basis for this model may be found in A. Prou, THE
ECONOMacs OF WELFARE 451-61 (4th ed. 1962).
345. See CHANMERLAMN & KUHN 424-25.
346. REYNOLDS 435, notes that proposals not meeting these standards are not taken
seriously by the other party, although certain demands which may be regarded initially
as absurd may in the course of time be regarded seriously by both parties. Making
demands completely out of line with community expectations may be evidence of a
failure to comply with the good faith bargaining requirement of LMRA § 8, 29 U.S.C.
§ 159 (1970). See, e.g., Diamond Constr. Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 161 (1967). One of
the interesting effects of unionization upon community standards is the destruction
of a wage decrease as an acceptable economic proposal. REYNo.Ds 181.
347. Normally, one thinks of union demands and employer offers, the latter being
a diminutive version of the former. The employer, however, may make demands
which, if agreed to, will have the effect of lowering his costs. For the purpose of
this discussion, I will consider an employer's counter-demands part of his offer.
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occur at the precise point at which it does. 48 The answer is essentially
that the point of final agreement is the point at which the cost of
one party's disagreeing with the other exceeds the cost of agreeing with
the other.3 49
What are the costs of agreeing or disagreeing? They vary, of
course, depending upon the parties and the circumstances. For the
employer, the cost of agreeing or disagreeing is always measured in
terms of lost profits. The cost of agreeing to the employer is the loss
of profits due to increased labor costs and customer losses. Of course,
the amount of profits lost will not equal the value to the employees
of the employer's concessions because he will pass most of his increased
labor costs on to his customers. The net cost of his agreement will
thus be the total of his costs not passed on to his customers plus the
total lost profits occasioned by his losing some of his customers as
a result of his higher prices.350 When the employer is forced to make
concessions to other employees which he would not have made but
for his commitment to the first group of employees, the loss of profits
incurred thereby must also be included as part of the cost of the em-
ployer's agreeing with the first group.351 The cost of disagreeing to
an employer is the loss of profits plus the incurrence of special costs
which result from his employees' concerted action. These would in-
clude any direct losses suffered by him while such action was going
on, loss of business in that period, and any future loss of profits at-
tributable to the permanent loss of customers who turn to other suppli-
ers. '"' The cost of disagreeing to the employer thus depends ulti-
348. This question was not answered by classical economists. REYNoLDs 425.
For modem approaches, see N. CHAMBERLAIN, A GENERAL THEORY OF ECONOMIC
PRocEss 80-82 (1955); J. HicKs, THE THEORY OF WAGES 149-58 (2d ed. 1966)
[hereinafter cited as HicKs]; REYNOLDS 428-32.
349. N. CHAMBERLAMN, supra note 348, at 81.
350. If the employer has a monopoly or near monopoly so that he can pass on the
cost of his agreement to his customers without diminution of profit or loss of busi-
ness, his cost of agreeing is zero and he is likely to put up little resistance to union
demands, as an examination of the construction industry bargaining in the last decade
reveals.
351. CHAMBERLAIN & KUHN 182-87. Contrary to Chamberlain's and Kuhn's con-
tention, the employer generally should not attempt to discount the future costs of such
concessions (although as a practical matter it may be impossible not to continue them
in the next contract) because these costs are not part of the contract being negotiated.
The employer is calculating his costs not for the purpose of measuring a long-term
situation, but solely to determine whether for the contractual period in question it
would cost him more to agree with the union than to disagree with it.
352. An employer who stands in danger of permanently losing customers in the
Vol. 1973:469]
Washington University Open Scholarship
532 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1973:469
mately on the duration of the concerted action undertaken by the em-
ployees to obtain their demands.
The cost of agreeing to the employee js the value of the union's
demands not granted by the employer, plus the cost of any employer
counter-demands accepted by the union. The cost of disagreeing to
the employee is the loss of income he sustains in the course of con-
certed action against the employer.' 8 This cost would not be as great
as the amount of gross wages lost by him during concerted action be-
cause a portion of these wages would be taken by taxes and work ex-
penses. Moreover, if an employee secures employment during a strike,
his loss of income is reduced. Again, the cost of disagreeing to the
employee depends ultimately on how long the employer is willing to
endure the losses incurred by the concerted action of his employees.
Bargaining is a process by which one party convinces the other that
the cost of disagreeing exceeds the cost of agreeing. There are three
main tactics by which one party maneuvers the other into this position.
The first might be termed "persuasion." One party seeks to convince
the other that the costs of agreement are less than they appear because
the concessions will not be costly, while the costs of disagreement are
higher than they appear because the demanding party has greater abil-
ity and greater willingness to enforce his demands by means of eco-
nomic action. The second tactic is "coercion." One party seeks to con-
vince the principals of the other side, either by exerting economic
pressure or by eliciting the support of the government or the public,
that he is negotiating from a position of superior strength .3 4 The third
tactic is "compromise"-reducing one's demands so as to reduce the
cost of agreement for the other side.355
event of a labor dispute is in a very weak bargaining position. Sometimes, however,
the union cannot take advantage of his weakness because his loss of customers will
result in loss of jobs for union members. See Dunlop, The Function of the Strike, in
FRONTERS OF COLLECTrvE BARGAINING 103 (J. Dunlop & N. Chamberlain eds. 1967).
353. Since the employee's leisure time is of value to him, the real loss, particu-
larly during a short strike, might be considerably less than the loss of income figure
might suggest. Occasionally, the cost of disagreeing may be loss of a job because of
replacement by another worker, replacement by a machine, or elimination of a job be-
cause the employer is a marginal producer. CHAMBERLAIN & KUHN 180. Unfortu-
nately, it is seldom possible for an employee to predict this cost and thus take it into
account.
354. To the extent that this tactic involves public or governmental pressure, it
might be regarded as increasing the cost of disagreement for the other side. Id.
at 181-82.
355. This may also reduce the cost of disagreeing by dissipating the other party's
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Since the cost of disagreeing almost always exceeds the cost of agree-
ing for one side, and often for both, when the deadline for action
approaches a bargain will usually be reached. Normally, this bargain
will represent a compromise between the last position of each party,
the exact point of compromise between the two offers being determined
by the parties' conception of the cost of agreeing versus the cost of
disagreeing, as indicated in the following example.
One day before the date of expiration of their contract there is a
ten-cent per hour differential between union and management. This
differential may be capitalized at present values as $10 million. More-
over, both employer and union will lose $1 million for each week the
strike goes on. The union has the economic capability of striking for
six weeks. Under these circumstances the parties will compromise by
adjusting their respective offers five cents in the direction of the other,
since it is less expensive for the employer to grant a five-cent increase,
at a cost of $5 million, than to endure a six-week strike which will
end with no increase in wage costs, but will cost $6 million. Now
let us assume that the union could strike for only four weeks. This
would mean that at the end of four weeks the union would have to come
back at the employer's terms without compromise. Meanwhile, how-
ever, the employer would have lost $4 million. Under these circum-
stances, the employer will raise his offer three cents and the un-
ion will decrease its demand seven cents. But now let us assume that
the union would lose only $500,000 per week and could strike for
ten weeks. Under these circumstances, the employer would have to
raise his offer by 7.5 cents and the union decrease its demand by only
2.5 cents.
Why, then, do strikes occur? Sometimes they occur because the
parties are engaged in economic warfare rather than collective bargain-
ing. 56  Often they occur because it is not politically possible for nego-
tiators to accept an offer, even though the cost of disagreeing exceeds
the cost of agreeing.3 7  A frequent cause of strikes is miscalculation
willingness to fight. Id. at 187-88. See generally Livernash, The Relation of Power
to the Structure and Process of Collective Bargaining, 6 J. LAW & ECON. 10 (1963).
356. See REYNOLDS 441; note 338 supra.
357. Political infeasibility may result from the need to take action to maintain the
negotiator's position or the position of his principal, from fear of rivals, from actual
demands of the principals (union members or stockholders), or from the expecta-
tions of the community and the government. REYNOLDS 441. A negotiator may by
his tactics make it politically infeasible for him to accept a given offer. Id. at 437.
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of the cost of either agreeing or disagreeing-usually the latter, since
it is less susceptible of exact calculation.s 8 Finally, the most frequent
cause of strikes is the parties' failure to reveal by their demands their
actual expectations.
For obvious reasons, the course of each strike will be determined
by its cause. Strikes which are a form of warfare will continue until
one side or the other has won its principle. Strikes which are politi-
cally oriented will continue until it is politically feasible for negotiators
to accept a settlement which will probably not differ substantially from
the settlement which would have occurred without a strike. Strikes
which occur as a result of miscalculation will continue until a new
and correct calculation is made.3s5 Strikes which result from a failure
of negotiation will terminate once the parties honestly reveal their
demands.36 0
It should be obvious from this discussion that the provision of public
subsidies to strikers may drastically affect the ultimate result produced
by the collective bargaining process, since such assistance will reduce
the cost of the strike to the employees while simultaneously increasing
their capability to continue the strike.36 1 The impact of such benefits
upon the cost to the average employee of continuing a strike is shown
by the following example.
Joe Steelworker, his wife, and two children subsist fairly comfortably
358. HIcKs 14647:
If there is considerable divergence of opinion between the employer and the
union representative about the length of time the men will hold out rather
than accept a given set of terms, then the union may refuse to go below a
certain level, because its leaders believe that they can induce the employer to
consent to it by taking anything less; while the employer may refuse to con-
cede it, because he does not believe the union can hold out long enough for a
concession to be worth his while. Under such circumstances, a deadlock is
inevitable and a strike will ensue, but it arises from the divergence of esti-
mates and from no other cause.
See REYNOLDS 441-42. Theoretically, it is possible for a strike to occur because there
is no contract zone.
359. REYNoLDs 430-31, 438.
360. HIcKs 144-46. That the parties in the course of negotiation engage in a
certain amount of bluffing as to their real demands makes this kind of mistake more
likely. See R.xNo. ns 438-39. Of course, the purpose of such bluffing is to obtain
through skillful negotiation more than might be obtained through economic force.
361. The significance of this factor can hardly be overestimated. Prior to the pro-
vision of public subsidies to strikers, underlying every theory of bargaining power was
the common recognition that the employer had more staying power than his employees.
See HMc.s 144-45.
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in Pennsylvania on a gross weekly income of $110 ($2.75 per hour).
Joe's net income is only $87.93 because of the following deductions:
Municipal Wage Tax $1.10
FICA 6.50




In the event of a strike, Joe's disposable income stops. Even though
he may own a home, household furnishings, an automobile, and life
insurance and have $1,499 in a bank account, he will be eligible for
food stamps.362 If he has no income whatsoever, he can receive $112
worth of food stamps per month at no charge 3 But he should not
content himself with food stamps; instead, he should file an application
for welfare benefits. He will be eligible for benefits even though he
may own a house, car, and so forth, as long as his liquid assets do
not exceed $50. If he owns real estate, a lien will be placed on it
to effectuate repayment. If he does not own real estate, no attempt
will be made to recover the amount of welfare benefits.3 64 In Pennsyl-
vania, Joe and his family would receive $297 per month in welfare,
but would then have to spend $82 of it to purchase their $112 worth
of food stamps."6 5 Between welfare and food stamps, they would re-
ceive a public, non-taxable subsidy of $327 per month, or approxi-
mately $75 per week-only $13 per week less than their normal in-
come.
362. 7 C.F.R. § 271.3(c)(4) (1973) sets the maximum allowable resources of a
household at $1,500. Excluded from "resources" are "the home, automobile, house-
hold goods, cash value of life insurance policies, and personal effects." Id. § 271.3(c) (4) (iii).
363. See 36 Fed. Reg. 14,118 (1971). Food stamp purchase requirements are de-
termined by reference to net monthly income. As a household's net income increases
it has to pay more for the same value in stamps.
364. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 1974 (1968). See Charleston v. Wohlgemuth, 332
F. Supp. 1175 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (three-judge court), affd, 405 U.S. 970 (1972). For
discussion of state repayment provisions, see Graham, Public Assistance: The Right to
Receive; the Obligation to Repay, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 451, 475-94 (1968).
365. 7 C.F.R. § 271.3(c)(1)(i)(g) (1973) requires that "payments received from
federally aided public assistance programs, general assistance programs, or other as.
istance programs based on need" be included in computing a household's income for
purposes of eligibility in the food stamp program. Thus, when Joe's family increases
its "income" with the state welfare grant of $297, it must pay more to receive the
same food stamp value. See note 363 supra.
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If Joe lived in New York, he would be entitled to receive $55 per
week in unemployment compensation after the strike had gone on for
seven weeks. Receipt of unemployment compensation would, how-
ever, render Joe's family ineligible for AFDC-U.360 In New York he
would receive $308 per month in welfare benefits as compared with
$297 per month in Pennsylvania. Accordingly, in New York his total
subsidy would amount to $334 per month or almost $77 per week-
only $11 per week less than his normal income.
In this connection it should be noted that Joe would probably be
permitted to receive welfare and food stamps even if his assets ex-
ceeded the allowable amount because the asset limitations are rarely
enforced against strikers.3 17  Further, although the amount of any
strike benefits made available to Joe by his union should, by state
regulation, be offset against the welfare benefits payable to him, in
actual practice this probably does not occur. If these benefits amounted
to $13 per week and were not offset, Joe would be in no worse finan-
cial position striking than working if he lived in Pennsylvania, and
would be in better position if he lived in New York. 08
It is now incontrovertible that the provision of public subsidies to
strikers in the form of welfare benefits, unemployment compensation,
and food stamps has enhanced the ability of the striker to sustain a
long strike.369 As one of the participants in the 1970 General Motors
strike observed, "They can't starve us out now that we're getting these
food stamps. We can go on forever." 370  Indeed, the impact of such
subsidies was visible in the ratification vote on the settlement agree-
ment which ended the General Electric strike of 1969. The New York
employees who were receiving unemployment compensation voted
against ratification; the agreement was ratified only because the over-
whelming majority of non-New York strikers who did not receive un-
employment compensation voted for it.371  Officials of unions whose
members have been the beneficiaries of strike subsidies have been quite
open in admitting the significance of their impact. 172
366. See note 226 supra.
367. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
368. For discussion of the impact of subsidies on strikers' families during the 1970
General Motors strike, see U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Nov. 23, 1970, at 15.
369. For the best compilation of empirical evidence, see TMIEBLOT & CowIN
49-185.
370. 116 CoNG. REc. 36,604 (1970) (remarks of Cong. Goodling).
371. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1970, at 42, col. 2.
372. E.g., 77 AM. FEDRA Tiomsr, July, 1970, at 1, 5-6 (Chairman of the AFL-
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By enhancing the economic ability of the striker to endure a long
strike, the provision of public subsidies inevitably results in higher set-
tlements2 7 3  This impact has led the AFL-CIO's Community Services
group to redouble its efforts. 374 It has become customary in many
communities for union officials to arrange with local welfare officials
for the expedited processing of welfare applications by striking union
members;175 some union officials even assist in such processing. 70 Not
surprisingly, this situation has led to widespread fraud. 77 Moreover,
the use of subsidies by strikers is likely to increase in the future as the
possibility of receiving such aid becomes better known and worker re-
sistance to taking advantage of welfare decreases. 37
This analysis indicates that the provision of public subsidies to strik-
ers imposes additional costs on society beyond the basic expense of
the subsidies. One of these additional costs is that of the strike itself.
Admittedly, the provision of subsidies does not ordinarily cause strikes,
since the parties take subsidies into account in calculating the cost of
CIO's Coordinated Bargaining Committee credited public subsidization as a "key con-
tribution" to the duration of the 1969-1970 General Electric strike).
373. See TmHEBLOT & COWIN 218. It must be noted that on occasion strikers re-
ceive private charity. See note 11 supra. The provision of private charity will have
the same effect on the collective bargaining process as the provision of public sub-
sidies. It is doubtful, however, that private charity has ever been given in sufficient
amounts to have any major effect on other than small strikes. The provision of pri-
vate union strike benefits has been a more commonplace method of supporting strikers.
Because a striker's receipt of strike benefits is included in income for purposes of de-
termining eligibility for welfare and food stamp benefits, unions frequently distribute
strike benefits selectively to families otherwise ineligible for public subsidization. See
Welfare for Strikers 103-05. Since strike benefits are derived from employee
contributions, they do not lower the cost of striking to the employees. But by en-
abling the strikers to stay out longer they may increase the employer's cost of dis-
agreeing and thus raise the ultimate cost of settlement. Neither private charity nor
union strike benefits, however, is open to the basic objection of unfairness which at-
taches to public expenditures to support a small group whose members are capable
of supporting themselves.
374. See THIFEBLOT & COWIN 38, 40-42. It has been assisted in this task by the
National Welfare Rights Organization. Id. at 47.
375. Id. at 49-185.
376. See Welfare for Strikers 94.
377. Striking Teamsters in Illinois obtained some $230,000 in food stamps by
fraud, and another $121,000 under "questionable circumstances." Chicago Daily
News, Nov. 1, 1971, at 4, col. 1. Approximately twenty percent of General Motors
strikers who received welfare benefits in Flint, Michigan, did so by misrepresenta-
tion. Welfare for Strikers 95. For other examples, see THIEBLOT & COWIN
155, 174.
378. See THmBLOT & COWIN 3; Welfare for Strikers 79-80.
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disagreeing versus the cost of agreeing, but it does insure that when
strikes occur they will go on longer because the union, which is usually
the weaker party, now has more staying power. Statistics demonstrate
a steady increase in the durability of strikes in the 1960's. 1n the
period from 1960 to 1966, idle man-days due to strikes averaged
.135 percent of working time. The statistics thereafter show a sharp
increase: 1967, .250; 1968, .280; 1969, .240; and 1970, .370.1"9 The
loss to society, as measured by the gross national product, resulting
from the increased duration of strikes is another cost of providing pub-
lic subsidies to strikers. 80
The most important cost of strike subsidies may be summed up in
a word: inflation.181 It is self-evident that increases in wage costs
will have some impact on prices. The extent of this impact varies,
depending on the relationship between labor costs associated with the
product and the total cost of the product.38 2  Of course, it should be
recognized that labor unions are by definition "inflating" in the sense
that a major objective of unionism is to raise the price of labor beyond
the level reached by the normal laws of supply and demand-a goal
accomplished through exploitation of the monopolistic or oligopolistic
position of the employee. 381 Historically, in the United States labor
unions have had the general effect of inflating wages and consequently
prices, though less by the mechanism of forcing wage increases when
demand is high than by resisting wage decreases when demand is
low.ss4 Until fairly recently unions were restrained from exercising
their monopoly power to the utmost. One restraint was imposed by com-
petition among employers. 8 5 Obviously, if increased wage levels force
unionized producers to raise prices significantly they will be driven out
of business by non-unionized producers.""8 Unions have always recog-
nized this fact and have often eliminated this restraint by unionizing
an entire major industry, thus eliminating "wage-competition. s38 7 Of
379. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Labor Statistics, 96 MONTHLY LAB. REV.
102, 133 (Aug. 1973) (Table 32: Work stoppages, 1946 to date).
380. REYNoLDs 447-48.
381. For empirical evidence, see THIBLOT & CowIN 49-185.
382. Id.
383. See REYNoLDs 611-14, 638-40.
384. See H. LE Ws, UNIONISM AND mRELATV WAGEs IN THE UzNm= STATES (1963);
REYNOLDS 181, 187-88.
385. See CHAmERI & KuHN 375-84.
386. See REYNOLDS 611.
387. See id. at 622-23.
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course, there remains the threat of competition from new entries in
the market employing non-union labor, particularly if the effect of un-
ionism is to create substantial unemployment. 388  This threat, how-
ever, is insignificant in most industries because of the high level of
entry costs. Although another threat of competition comes from for-
eign employers, unions seem to have the political power in most cases
to limit such competition when it becomes serious. 389  Finally, there
is the possibility of competition from substitute products. There is
often a real limit, however, on the extent to which one product may
be substituted for another. The major restraint on union exercise of
monopoly power was the resistance of the employer to increases
in wages.390 Even though the employer may be able to utilize his
position by passing on some of the costs of increased wages to his
customers, his profits will still suffer to some extent from increased
wage costs. This fact forces him to oppose the union's demands as
long as the cost of agreeing to such demands exceeds the cost of
disagreeing with them. The provision of subsidies to strikers has,
of course, the result of increasing the employer's cost of disagreeing
in many cases, sapping his will to resist, and, therefore, removing the
main restraint on the union's exercise of monopoly power.
Removal of this restraint results in abnormally high wage increases
reflected ultimately in price increases and inflation. It is not surpris-
ing, then, that the major expansion of the food stamp program-the
major source of subsidies for strikers-in 1966 was followed by an un-
paralleled period of inflation. While the Consumer Price Index rose
4.2 percent in 1968, 5.4 percent in 1969, and 5.9 percent in 1970,391
unemployment rose from 3.6 million in 1968 to 4.9 million in 1970.392
The inflation which characterized the beginning of this period was the
traditional demand-pull inflation which resulted from the Johnson Ad-
388. As a result of a decision by the United Mine Workers to maximize wages in
the coal industry and hence to force inefficient producers out of business, one-fourth
of all coal mined in the United States in 1962 came from non-unionized mines. See
CHAMBLAIN & KuIN 371.
389. Witness the steel quotas, the ten-percent import surcharge, and the general de-
mand for quotas and tariffs by unions in any industry threatened by foreign competition.
390. See CHAMmERLA & KuHm 380-81.
391. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Labor Statistics, 96 MONTHLY LAn. Ruv.
102, 120 (Aug. 1973) (Table 24: Consumer and Wholesale Price Indexes, annual
averages and changes, 1951-72).
392. id. at 106 (Table 7: Unemployment rates, by age and sex, seasonably ad-
justed), and earlier issues of the Monthly Labor Review.
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mini.tration's refusal to finance the Vietnam War by means of in-
creased taxes. In 1968, however, war expenditures were being cur-
tailed and the unemployment rate began to rise. The Consumer Price
Index continued not only to rise, but to rise at an even faster rate.
The novel phenomenon of increasing unemployment and rising
priceS3 93 indicated the presence of cost-push inflation, 3 4 resulting from
the elimination of the major restraint on union exercise of monopoly
power.
Another indirect cost of providing public subsidies to strikers is un-
employment. Of necessity, any union-secured increase in the wage level
is likely to result in loss of jobs in the particular employer's locale
since a change in the employer's marginal cost curve causes a decrease
in production and often a decrease in the number of individuals
employed. 395 Moreover, at some point an increase in the cost of labor
will result in the replacement of individuals by machines as the cost
of labor increases relative to the cost of capital. 90 Thus the provision
of public subsidies to strikers, by accelerating the rate of wage increase,
causes greater unemployment.
A final indirect cost of public subsidies to strikers is distortion of
the pattern of foreign trade. In general, as prices increase the United
States is less able to export products and more likely to import. The
increase in domestic prices resulting from increased wages is a major
cause of the failure to maintain a favorable balance of trade in this
country. 3 7  To the extent that this increase results from exaggerated
wage increases fostered by public subsidies to strikers, problems with
the balance of trade must be attributed to a policy of providing subsi-
dies to strikers.
393. In Samuelson & Solow, Analytical Aspects of Anti-Inflation Policy, 50 AM.
EcoN. Rnv. 177 (May 1960) (Papers & Proceedings of the 72d Annual Meeting of the
American Economic Ass'n), the authors assert that application of a Phillips curve in
the United States suggests that the mathematical relationship between unemployment
and price increase is such that five to six percent unemployment results in price sta-
bility, while three percent unemployment results in four to five percent inflation. The
occurrence of high unemployment with significant inflation presages a sharp shift to
the left in the American Phillips curve. See also REYNOLDS 191-92.
394. For discussion of cost-push inflation, see H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE
LEGAL PRocmSS 303, 378-79 n.ll (1968).
395. See REYNOLDS 630.
396. Id. at 211.
397. Of course, devaluation may erase this effect.
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VI. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
The provision of public subsidies to strikers gives rise to a basic
legal question: Does providing state subsidies to strikers interfere with
the federal regulatory scheme governing labor-management relations?
Preemption is a unique doctrine of American law designed to deal
with the potential conflict between federal and state legislation which
results from the creation under the Constitution of a federal system
of government. In theory, of course, this conflict is easily resolvable
by the supremacy clause;398 in the event of direct conflict between
federal and state law, federal law will prevail, 399 assuming, of course,
that the federal government has power to legislate in the area in ques-
tion. The real problem, however, arises with indirect conflict between
federal and state regulation. It is here that application of the doctrine
of preemption is most difficult.
The doctrine of preemption in the interstate commerce area can be
invoked pursuant to two different rationales. First, the doctrine may
be invoked on the theory that an area regulated or affected by state
action must be regulated by-and only by-the federal government.
Secondly, the doctrine may be invoked on the theory that the existence
of federal regulation in an area precludes per se state regulation. 00
It seems clear that preemption, to the extent it applies to labor-manage-
ment relations, is appropriate under the second theory and not the first.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the existence of federal regu-
lation of some aspects of labor-management relations does not preclude
all state regulation.40' A problem arises when a state attempts to regu-
398. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
399. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
400. See Note, Federal Preemption in Labor Relations, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 128,
129-30 (1968).
401. E.g., Weber v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 480 (1955): "By the
Taft-Hartley Act, Congress did not exhaust the full sweep of legislative power over
industrial relations given by the Commerce Clause." See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171
(1967); Hanna Mining Co. v. District 2, Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 382 U.S. 181
(1965); Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wisconsin Empl. Relations Bd., 315 U.S.
740 (1942). Some federal labor legislation expressly leaves to the states areas of
regulation not specifically taken from them, e.g., Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act § 603, 29 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1970).
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late an aspect of labor-management relations which is not expressly
reserved to the federal government by statute,40 2 but which arguably falls
within the federal regulatory scheme.
Among the employee activities protected by the NLRA is "the right
to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bar-
gain collectively through representatives of [his] own choosing and
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . 40 While the
NLRA explicitly makes it an "unfair labor practice" for an employer
"to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 157,' ' 404 including the right to bargain
collectively, this prohibition is applied judicially to states as well. °1
Along with restricting state interference with NLRA "protected activ-
ities" such as collective bargaining, courts have confined the jurisdic-
tion for adjudicating federally prescribed "unfair labor practices" to the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). 40 6  In the leading case,
Garner v. Teamsters Local 766,407 the state was enjoined from applying
state laws which prohibited certain unfair practices in striking and
picketing.
402. E.g., NLRA § 9(c)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(A) (1970), grants ex-
clusive authority to the NLRB to investigate complaints by employees that their em-
ployer refuses to recognize their collective bargaining representative. See Algoma
Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Empl. Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 301 (1949).
403. NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). See NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l,
361 U.S. 477, 490 (1960):
[1If the [National Labor Relations] Board could regulate the choice of
economic weapons that may be used as a part of collective bargaining, it
would be in a position to exercise considerable influence upon the substantive
terms on which the parties contract. As the parties' own devices became
more limited, the Government might have to enter even more directly into
the negotiation of collective agreements. Our labor policy is not presently
erected on a foundation of government control of the results of negotiations.
... Nor does it contain a charter for the National Labor Relations Board
to act at large in equalizing disparities of bargaining power between employer
and union.
See also American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
404. NLRA § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970).
405. Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945) (Florida statute prohibit-
ing union and its representative from acting as collective bargaining agents without
complying with prescribed conditions declared invalid). See generally Cox, supra
note 117.
406. See Cox, supra note 117, at 1341-48.
407. 346 U.S. 485 (1953). See also Teamsters Local 24 v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283
(1959) (state antitrust law may not prevent execution of collective bargaining agree-
ment).
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In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon0 s the Su-
preme Court avoided categorizing the activities of a union in attempting
to unionize an unorganized shop as either a protected activity or an un-
fair labor practice, and established a new preemption test which has en-
dured to the present: If the activities which a state attempts to regulate
are arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA, state jurisdiction
must yield to the NLRB's exclusive determination." 9 The rationale for
the test is that leaving states free "to regulate conduct so plainly within
the central aim of federal regulation involves too great a danger of
conflict between power asserted by the Congress and requirements im-
posed by state law. ' 410 The Court made it clear that the test was not the
intention of the state in enacting the legislation, but rather its impact on
the federal regulatory scheme.4"'
The Garmon rule was extended by Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton412
to cover state regulation of activities which were not arguably regulated
or protected by the NLRA, but which must be left to exclusive federal
disposition to protect the congressionally established balance in labor-
management relations. Morton thus recognized that the purpose of
federal regulation of labor-management relations is not simply to protect
or prohibit specified activities, but to establish a system under which
there is a "balance. . . between the conflicting interests of the union,
the employees, the employer and the community.' 413 Although there is
408. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
409. Id. at 245.
410. Id. at 244.
411. Id.:
Nor has it mattered whether the States have acted through laws of broad
general application rather than laws specifically directed towards the gov-
ernance of industrial relations. Regardless of the mode adopted, to allow
the States to control conduct which is the subject of national regulation would
create potential frustration of national purposes.
412. 377 U.S. 252 (1964).
413. Id. at 259. See Cox, Labor Decisions of the Supreme Court at the October
Term, 1957, 44 VA. L. REv. 1057, 1068-69 (1958):
[Tihe federal law does not deal only with extreme cases of misconduct leaving
debatable instances to the states. Within the field of labor-management rela-
tions the NLRA is a comprehensive code of regulation. The heart of national
labor policy is the private adjustment of conflicts over wages, hours, and
terms and conditions of employment by the negotiation and administration of
collective bargaining agreements . . . . The progress of unionization and the
balance of power affects the way collective bargaining works. . . . At each
point, formulating the national labor policy involved balancing the interests of
management, union, employees, and public in union organization and collective
bargaining as methods for establishing terms and conditions of employment.
Any state law which affects the balance is inconsistent with the national labor
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some question as to the future viability of the Garmon rule,414 and
although the extension of the rule under Morton is subject to a num-
ber of exceptions, 415 preemption is still determined largely by refer-
ence to the "arguably protected or prohibited" and federal balancing
scheme tests.416
Federal maintenance of free collective bargaining has been protected
against state interference by application of these rules. Perhaps the
most common example of state interference is the attempt to
force the parties in a labor dispute to settle the dispute on terms
which are, in effect, dictated by the state. In Street Employees Divi-
sion 998 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board'17 the Supreme
policy embodied in the LMRA and, under the supremacy clause, cannot be
applied in situations affecting interstate commerce.
414. In Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971),
the Garmon rule was applied to preempt state court consideration of an employee's
complaint that his union had violated its own constitution in successfully requesting
the employer to discharge him for failing to pay union dues. The four dissenting
justices raised serious questions as to the validity of the Garmon rule. Two of the
five-man majority (Justices Black and Harlan) are no longer on the Court. Never-
theless, although Garmon may be interpreted somewhat more strictly-even by
changing "arguably" to "probably" or "actually," see Longshoreman's Local 1416 V.
Ariadne Shipping Co., 397 U.S. 195, 201 (1970) (White, J., concurring)-the prin-
ciple will probably remain.
415. E.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959)
(activities which are "a merely peripheral concern of the Labor Management Relations
Act," or which touch interests "deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility," such
as "conduct marked by violence and imminent threat to public order"). See United
Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
416. Cox, supra note 117, at 1365:
Virtually all the decisions conform to the proposition deduced from Morton:
unless the conduct is actually protected against employer interference by sec-
tions 7 and 8(a) (1), a state's jurisdiction within the field of labor-manage-
ment relations depends upon whether it is seeking to apply substantive or
remedial law whose formulation or application would involve weighing the
same competing interests of employers, employees, labor unions, and the pub-
lic among which Congress struck a balance in establishing a national legal
framework for the conduct of organizational activity, collective bargaining,
and labor disputes.
Justification for protecting this congressional "balance" was offered by Justice Harlan
in Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 286 (1971):
The course of events that eventuated in the enactment of a comprehensive
national labor law, entrusted for its administration and development to a
centralized, expert agency, as well as the very fact of that enactment itself,
reveals that a primary factor in this development was perceived incapacity of
common-law courts and state legislatures, acting alone, to provide an informed
and coherent basis for stabilizing labor relations conflict and for equitably
and delicately structuring the balance of power among competing forces so as
to further the common good.
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Court invalidated a Wisconsin statute which prohibited strikes by em-
ployees of public utilities and provided for compulsory arbitration of
disputes. In General Electric Co. v. Callahan41 the Massachusetts
Board of Conciliation and Arbitration was enjoined from advising the
parties to a labor dispute and from making available to the public
its written findings and recommendation. Although the Board had
little direct power, the court believed that "the indirect coercive effect
of its actions upon the parties to a labor dispute is by no means insub-
stantial," 41 1 citing the probable effect of government hearings on the
bargaining positions of the parties, and the pressures of public opinion
following publication of the Board's findings.420  In John Han-
cock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Commissioner of Insurance42' a
state court invalidated under the preemption doctrine a Massachusetts
statute which granted owners of debit life insurance policies an added
grace period for payment of premiums during strikes by collecting
agents of an insurance company. Although the court recognized that
the statute was intended not to regulate the activities of the parties
to a dispute but to protect policy holders against forfeitures, it ruled
that "in determining whether it conflicts with the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, it is irrelevant that the state statute was enacted for purposes
not related to labor relations. 4 2 2 The test, according to the John Han-
cock court, is whether the state statute has an effect on the federal
417. 340 U.S. 383 (1951).
418. 294 F.2d 60 (1st Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 832 (1965).
419. Id. at 67.
420. In Hawaii Tribune-Herald, Ltd. v. Kimura, 272 F. Supp. 175 (D. Hawaii
1967), the court refused to invoke preemption to enjoin government officials from
withdrawing advertising from a newspaper during a strike by the newspaper's employ-
ees. It was unclear from the evidence, however, whether the purpose of the with-
drawing was to exert pressure on the newspaper to capitulate to the union's demands.
In factual situations similar to General Electric, attempts by state agencies to in-
vestigate labor disputes were enjoined in Oil Workers Local 5-783 v. Arkansas Louisi-
ana Gas Co., 332 F.2d 64 (10th Cir. 1964), and Grand Rapids City Coach Lines v.
Howlett, 137 F. Supp. 667 (W.D. Mich. 1955). In Delaware Coach Co. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 265 F. Supp. 648 (D. Del. 1967), the Delaware Public Service Com-
mission was enjoined from conducting a hearing to decide whether to revoke a bus
company's charter during a labor dispute between the bus company and its employees,
on the ground that the hearing would constitute "outside coercive pressure" which
might "imperil the freedom of collective bargaining." In Cab Operating Corp. v.
City of New York, 243 F. Supp. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), the city was enjoined from
conducting mock elections for selection of cab drivers' representatives on the ground
that the NLRB has exclusive authority to conduct representation elections.
421. 349 Mass. 390, 208 N.E.2d 516 (1965).
422. Id. at 400, 208 N.E.2d at 523.
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scheme. The court concluded that free collective bargaining is essen-
tial to that scheme, and that the state law affected the bargaining be-
tween the insurance company and the agents' union by "reinforc[ing]
the power of the strike weapon in the hands of the agents. 423  Thus
state acts which affect the economic strengths of the parties and
thereby upset the balance of power in collective bargaining are within
the preemption doctrine.424
Despite the protests of the Minter court 25 concerning the difficul-
ties of applying the preemption doctrine in non-Garmon situations, it
is clear that other courts frequently apply the doctrine in cases in which
state regulation outside the "arguably protected or prohibited" class
threatens the system of collective bargaining. The Minter court as-
serted that the provison of welfare benefits to strikers
is not an invasion by the state into an area of conduct regulated by a
national instrumentality but a tangential frustration of the national
policy objective of unfettered collective bargaining by state economic
sustenance of some of the individuals who participate in federally
protected, concerted activity.420
For a "tangential frustration" to come within the preemption doctrine
under this analysis, the balance of "degree of conflict" between federal
and state regulation and the "relative importance of the federal and state
423. Id. The court found the right to "free collective bargaining" of central im-
portance to federal regulation:
"Collective bargaining, with the right to strike at its core, is the essence of
the federal scheme." Division 1287, Amalgamated Assn. of St. Elec. Ry. &
Motor Coach Employees of America v. State of Missouri, 374 U.S. 74, 82.
. Although the term "free collective bargaining" does not appear in the
National Labor Relations Act, it is found in the legislative history. Sen.
Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 13 (1947); 93 Cong. Rec. 3835
(1947) (remarks of Senator Taft). The courts have assumed it is basic to
the Federal labor laws. See National Labor Relations Bd. v. American Nati.
Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 401-403....
Id.
424. See note 420 supra. Cf. Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235 (1967),
in which the Court held that a state agency's interpretation of Florida's unemployment
insurance statute conflicted with the supremacy clause. The agency had ruled that by
filing an unfair labor practice charge against her employer during a lay-off, an em-
ployee became ineligible for unemployment benefits on the ground that her "unemploy-
meat" was "due to a labor dispute." Id. at 237, citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 443.06
(1966). The Court reasoned that the state should not be permitted to withdraw state
benefits from employees "simply because they cooperate with the Government's con-
stitutional plan." 389 U.S. at 239. See also International Auto. Workers v. O'Brien,
339 U.S. 454 (1950).
425. See notes 113-25 supra and accompanying text.
426. 435 F.2d at 992.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss3/1
A STUDY OF SUBSIDIES FOR STRIKERS
interests" must swing heavily in favor of preserving the federal scheme.427
The court concluded that, despite a paucity of evidence, it is doubtful
that "a significant frustration of federal collective bargaining policy is ef-
fected by the granting of welfare benefits to indigent strikers," and
that even if so affected, the state's interest in its citizens' social welfare
is "so insubstantial compared to the federal interest that Congress must
be supposed to have deprived the state of such power to serve that
interest. '428
The analysis in Minter is assailable on two grounds. First, it mis-
construes precedent in the labor-management preemption field. Courts
which have applied the preemption doctrine to non-Garmon situations
have not balanced the importance of the state interest with federal la-
bor policy. Indeed, they have in some instances ignored the state's
objectives and examined only the practical effect of the state's activities
on the federally protected balance of negotiating power. The state's
objectives are relevant only within the "local feeling and responsibil-
ity" exception to Garmon, and there preemption is inapplicable only in
cases in which the state is exercising its traditional power to maintain
law and order and to prevent violence.429 There is no basis in prece-
dent for assuming that the state has a "deeply rooted" interest in subsi-
dizing strikers, or that the state subsidizes strikers to maintain law and
order. Secondly, the court's conclusion that subsidization of strikers
has no "significant impact" on labor-management relations is demon-
strably false.430
To suggest that the Minter court erred in not invoking the pre-
emption doctrine does not imply that all subsidies to strikers are pre-
cluded. Obviously, preemption has no application in purely federal
subsidies such as the food stamp program. Preemption should not
be precluded, however, merely because the federal government under-
writes part of the costs of state subsidization programs such as unem-
ployment compensation and AFDC-U, so long as the states retain the
power to determine the eligibility requirements for these programs.431
427. Id.
428. Id. at 994.
429. See note 415 supra.
430. See notes 338-97 supra and accompanying text. If there were no significant
impact, a certain amount of conflict would be blended. See Mandelker, supra note
173, at 511-18.
431. In Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235 (1967), see note 424 supra,
the Court, in invoking the preemption doctrine, did not consider whether federal-state
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Application of the preemption doctrine to the payment of welfare
benefits (although not unemployment compensation) is probably more
questionable today than at the time of Minter in view of a recent HEW
regulation4 32 which specifically leaves to the states the question of
striker eligibility by permitting states to exclude from the definition
of "unemployed father" a father who is unemployed as a result of
his participation in a labor dispute. Although the regulation obviously
does not constitute an expression of congressional intent which would
clearly preclude application of the preemption doctrine in the welfare
area, it does constitute an expression of opinion by the federal exec-
utive that state provision of welfare benefits to strikers does not unduly
interfere with the federal regulatory scheme for labor-management re-
lations.4 33  Hopefully, the Supreme Court will ultimately resolve the
question.4 34
VII. POSTSCRIPT: SUBSIDIES AND DEMOCRACY
It seems clear that the provision of public subsidies to strikers has
a detrimental effect on the public as a whole which far outweighs
the benefit it confers on the strikers. Although I have emphasized
judicial attacks on the provision of these subsidies, it should be recog-
nized that the question is essentially a political one which inevitably
must be resolved by the elected branches of the government rather
than the judiciary. Unfortunately, the American political process
seems presently incapable of resisting the organized efforts of deter-
mined minorities to enact legislation which promotes special interests
in proportion to the extent it damages the public interest. Indeed,
the legislative battle over the anti-striker amendment to the Food
Stamp Act435 is typical of the "democratic" solution to political prob-
funding of the unemployment compensation program constituted some sort of con-
gressional blessing of state policies on eligibility requirements and payment of benefits.
But see cases discussed notes 179-237 supra and accompanying text.
432. 38 Fed. Reg. 18,549 (1973), revising 45 C.F.R. § 233.100(a)(1) (1972).
433. The mere possession of power by the federal government to regulate eligibil-
ity criteria for welfare benefits under the Social Security Act may, although unexer-
cised, invoke application of the preemption doctrine. If the legislature specifically
leaves the matter to the states, however, the doctrine is precluded. It is questionable
that HEW's delegation, by itself, renders preemption inapplicable.
434. The Minter court indicated that the preemption question would be best re-
solved by Congress. 435 F.2d at 993-94. This position ignores the fact that Congress
is frequently incapable of legislating in the labor-management relations area, and that
preemption is basically a judicially developed doctrine.
435. See notes 252-86 supra and accompanying text.
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lems. In that instance, urban congressmen who are normally aligned
with labor interests combined with rural congressmen to pass a farm
subsidy-food stamp bill which benefits labor and farming interests, al-
though arguably not the interests of the country. Similarly, a "con-
servative" administration ostensibly opposed to the interests of labor
unions nevertheless refuses to take decisive action to eliminate subsidies
to union members who support its foreign policy. It seems clear that
the provision of subsidies to strikers, like the provision of subsidies
to a number of other special interest groups, cannot and will not be
resolved until fundamental reforms are made in the electoral process
which, by making legislators less dependent for campaign finances on
those groups with ample financial resources, will make it more feasible
for legislators to eliminate the special privileges given to such groups
in exchange for their electoral support. Even the accomplishment of
this reform, however, will not necessarily mean elimination of strike
subsidies, for the influence of labor unions depends not only on the
money which they contribute to the campaigns of favored candidates,
but also upon the voting strength of their members. Thus it is possi-
ble that even with a reformed electoral system the interests of a numeri-
cally significant and cohesive minority will be advanced at the expense
of the public at large. It could be argued that such a situation is
the price of democracy.4 30  History, however, suggests that democracy
can price itself out of the market place.437
436. See R. DAHL, supra note 243.
437. It is, of course, possible that the provision of subsidies to strikers will be cur-
tailed, though not completely eliminated, within the context of a comprehensive revi-
sion of the welfare system. Both a negative income tax system and the proposed
Family Assistance Plan would replace the present system of providing benefits based
on a family's income in a given month with a system which would make eligibility for
benefits depend on a family's annual income, a more realistic measure of need. See
Welfare for Strikers 110-14. See generally Hearings on Income Maintenance
Programs Before the Joint Economic Comm., 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). For an
attempt to clarify the relationship between the Family Assistance Plan and the food
stamp program, see Hearings on Nutrition & Human Needs of the Select Comm. on
Nutrition & Human Needs, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 12 (1969). Either system would
presumably provide benefits only to the most impoverished strikers because the annual
income of many workers, even making allowance for the loss of income resulting from
a strike, would still exceed the eligibility criteria for either program.
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